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The economics of altruistic behavior, and specifically the economics of charitable giving, 
is a large and rich field of research. This is not without cause: charitable giving is a significant 
household decision. We contribute in several ways to better understanding this fundamental 
household financial decision. 
Despite widespread interest, there is little systematic evidence on the relationship between 
income, wealth, and charitable giving. In Chapter II, we use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID) spanning 2001-2017 to provide descriptive statistics on this relationship. We find that, 
irrespective of specification, donative behavior increases with greater resources. 
Charitable giving is also incentivized by the U.S. tax code. In Chapter III, we use the PSID 
to get up-to-date estimates the tax price elasticity of charitable giving. We find that households 
that always itemize are less sensitive to changes in the tax treatment of donations than households 
that switch itemizing status. We apply these results to the provisions of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 
of 2017, taking into account the marginal propensity to donate from the increase in disposable 
income expected for most households, and predict a ~3.5% decrease in total individual giving. 
 In Chapter IV, we apply this methodology and data to evaluate a hypothetical policy world 
where religious organizations (e.g. churches, mosques) lose their tax-exempt status. We document 
the poverty of reliable, available data to robustly answer the different dimensions of this question. 
Despite this, we roughly estimate a significant increase in churches’ expenses alongside a 1.8% 
decrease in giving to religious organizations. 
 iii 
Chapter V focuses in on giving behavior to one specific cause type: disaster relief. We 
consider decisions made by a sample of Texan adults in two, lab-in-the-field, modified dictator 
games. Three decisions target different charitable organizations, all of which have a disaster-relief 
mission, but differ in the level of operation. A fourth targets an individual recipient who was a 
victim of a fire. Giving is significantly higher to national and local organizations compared to state. 
We find a higher propensity to donate and larger amount donated to the individual relative to all 
organizations. Subsequent analysis compares a number of demographic and attitudinal covariates 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Research on charitable giving can be broadly categorized into four approaches: individual 
economic decision-making; strategic interactions between actors (e.g. donors, charities, and the 
government); social exchanges between solicitors and potential donors; and empathic, moral, and 
cultural motives for giving (Andreoni and Payne, 2013). This set of essays addresses research 
questions in the first and last of these four categories.  
In Chapter II, we estimate the relationship between income, wealth, and charitable giving; 
in Chapter III, we calculate updated tax price elasticities of giving and apply those estimates to 
predict how the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 will affect charitable donations, while accounting 
for income and wealth utilizing what is learned in Chapter II; in Chapter IV, we evaluate the 
implications of a hypothetical policy – the removal of tax exemption for religious organizations – 
using the tools developed in Chapter III; and in Chapter V, we use a lab-in-the-field experiment to 
understand how donors consider giving to different geographic levels of disaster relief efforts. 
It is helpful to begin with a model of charitable giving to frame this analysis. We first 
consider charitable giving as both a public and private good (Andreoni, 1989). The original model 
of pure altruism (most thoroughly treated by Bergstrom et al. (1986)) considers giving only as it 
impacts the production of a public good. An important result of this model is that others’ gifts are 
perfect substitutes for one’s own (Andreoni, 2006). This means that if person 𝑗  donates an 
additional dollar then person 𝑖 will decrease her giving by one dollar. However, as Andreoni (2006) 
notes, this does not sufficiently explain observed charitable giving behavior.  
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Instead, we use as a starting point the impure altruism (“warm-glow giving”) model 
(Andreoni, 1989; 1990). This model allows for an agent’s utility to be a function of not only her 
consumption and the total production of the public good (as in the pure altruism model), but also 
her own private contribution to the public good. Put simply, people also get utility from being the 
person donating, not just from the overall level of the amount raised. 
Following Andreoni (1990). Let individual 𝑖 have utility function: 
𝑢𝑖 = 𝑢𝑖(𝐶𝑖 , 𝐺, 𝐺𝑖) 
where 𝐶𝑖 and 𝐺𝑖 are the consumption and giving, respectively, of individual 𝑖 and 𝐺 is aggregate 
giving to the public good. If we let 𝐺−𝑖 = ∑ 𝐺𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 , i.e. the gifts of every person except individual 
𝑖 to the public good, then we can solve the following optimization problem to obtain the supply of 
donations: 
max
𝐶𝑖,  𝐺𝑖,   𝐺 
𝑢𝑖(𝐶𝑖 , 𝐺, 𝐺𝑖) 
𝑠. 𝑡.  𝐶𝑖 + 𝐺𝑖 = 𝑌𝑖  
𝐺−𝑖 + 𝐺𝑖 = 𝐺 
where 𝑌𝑖 is the income of individual 𝑖. Both pure and impure altruism models assume that 𝐶𝑖 and 
𝐺𝑖 are normal goods, meaning that as 𝑌𝑖 increases so does agent 𝑖’s consumption of 𝐶𝑖 and 𝐺𝑖. We 
test this assumption in Chapter II by looking at the impact of income and wealth on charitable 
giving, but for now, following the literature, we take this as given and look at the implications of 
the model.  
 Solving the individual maximization problem, an important distinction from the pure 
altruism model arises: others’ gifts are now imperfect substitutes for individual 𝑖’s giving, i.e. there 
is incomplete crowd out. More plainly, this means that an agent does not necessarily respond to 
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the increased giving of others by decreasing her own giving by an offsetting amount; she cares 
about where the gift comes from, especially that she contributes 𝐺𝑖. The degree to which donations 
are crowded out is determined by the relative strength of warm-glow and altruistic motives for 
each agent. Further, the impure altruism model implies that as the number of individuals in the 
economy increases, giving becomes increasingly like a private good: warm-glow dominates 
altruistic determinants of utility.  
 This is important in the context of our data for Chapters II to IV where there are many 
people in the economy and many donors.1 Giving by one agent should have virtually no crowding-
out effect on the giving of another agent, on average, leaving an increase in income and wealth to 
more strongly mediate donation activity. In addition, it is important to note that for Chapters II to 
IV, we separate income and wealth in analysis and analyze their fluctuations over time. The 
standard impure altruism model is a single period optimization problem; as such, it does not treat 
income and wealth separately (i.e. 𝑌𝑖  is just individual 𝑖 ’s income) or consider intertemporal 
budgets. The methodology used in Chapters II to IV exploits variation in income, wealth, and 
giving over time and across households, making this model a useful but incomplete baseline for 
analysis. That said, the model’s main conclusions discussed above – about warm-glow giving 
dominating and crowding-out being minimal – still hold if we instead consider 𝑌𝑖 to be the sum of 
available resources (i.e. income plus wealth). 
 
1 In Chapter V, we look at how personal beliefs about the relative effectiveness of different types of organizations 
affect donation decisions. We do not model this explicitly in a utility-maximization context as above nor do we have 
the context of many donors in the economy as in Chapters II to IV. We can imagine that the level of an organization’s 
operation is a determinant in the amount of utility a gift generates. Our hypotheses and resulting estimation strategy 
for this are discussed in the chapter. 
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 It is important to note that the predictions of the impure altruism model only hold under 
conditions of perfect information about the “quality” of the public good. In the absence of perfect 
information, it is possible that giving by others – individuals in the economy or the government in 
the form of grants – could serve as a signal of the quality of the public good (e.g. charity) and 
encourage, or “crowd in”, donations by an individual (List, 2011). There has been a significant 
amount of research conducted that supports this idea (Andreoni and Payne, 2003; Gottfried, 2008).  
 For something more fitting to the context of our data, we turn to the dynamic model of 
giving behavior outlined in Auten, Sieg, and Clotfelter (2002) (ASC02). This model provides the 
basis for analysis in Chapter III (and therefore Chapter IV) by introducing income taxation. 
Following ASC02, and because of the conclusions from the impure altruism model, we simplify 
the model by treating giving solely as a private good. ASC02 represents an agent’s preferences 






where 𝑈𝑖(𝐺𝑖𝑠, 𝐶𝑖𝑠)  is agent 𝑖 ’s utility in period 𝑠  taking elements of her giving ( 𝐺𝑖𝑠 ) and 
consumption (𝐶𝑖𝑠). This is subject to an intertemporal budget constraint in each period 𝑡: 
𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝑊𝑖,𝑡+1 = (1 + 𝑟𝑖𝑡)𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝑖𝑡 − 𝑇𝑡(𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑊𝑖𝑡 , 𝑌𝑖𝑡 , 𝐺𝑖𝑡) 
 Where 𝑊𝑖𝑡 denotes agent 𝑖’s wealth at the beginning of time 𝑡, 𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the interest rate faced 
by agent 𝑖, and 𝑌𝑖𝑡  is income. 𝑇𝑡(∙) is the tax burden for 𝑖 in 𝑡, which is a function of income, 
giving, and interest gained on wealth. ASC02 does not explicitly specify the form of 𝑇𝑡(∙), but 
following the vast related literature we model the tax treatment of income and giving as (𝑌𝑖𝑡 −
𝐺𝑖𝑡)𝜏𝑖𝑡, where 𝜏𝑖𝑡  is the marginal tax rate for agent 𝑖 in period 𝑡. This means that income less 
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giving is the amount taxable by the government. For generality, we do not specify the tax treatment 
of wealth. We can then rewrite the budget constraint as: 
𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝑊𝑖,𝑡+1 = (1 + 𝑟𝑖𝑡)𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝑖𝑡 − (𝑌𝑖𝑡 − 𝐺𝑖𝑡)𝜏𝑖𝑡 − 𝑇𝑡(𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑊𝑖𝑡) 
Combing like terms yields: 
𝐶𝑖𝑡 + (1 − 𝜏𝑖𝑡)𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝑊𝑖,𝑡+1 = (1 + 𝑟𝑖𝑡)𝑊𝑖𝑡 + (1 − 𝜏𝑖𝑡)𝑌𝑖𝑡 − 𝑇𝑡(𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑊𝑖𝑡) 









 In words, this means that in each period an agent equates her marginal utility from giving 
and marginal utility from consumption, mediated by what is commonly called the “tax price of 
giving” 𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 1 − 𝜏𝑖𝑡. This equation shows the price of giving an additional dollar that agent 𝑖 
faces in period 𝑡: each dollar donated is a dollar less of income that is taxed, which reduces the tax 
bill by the marginal tax rate on that dollar, 𝜏𝑖𝑡. If 𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 0 (say, from a marginal tax rate of zero), 
then the utility-maximizing agent consumes and donates up to the point where her marginal 
utilities are equal. 
 This model provides a useful framework for how to think about giving when it is subsidized 
by the government through the tax system, as is the case in many countries (Andreoni, 2006). 
However, empirically estimating this optimal decision rule is computationally difficult. Similar to 
others in this empirical literature, we instead analyze a linearized version of the above model: 
𝑔𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
where 𝑔𝑖𝑡  and 𝑝𝑖𝑡 are the logarithms of donations and price, respectively; 𝑌𝑖𝑡 and 𝑊𝑖𝑡 are controls 
for income and wealth; 𝑿𝒊𝒕 is a vector of time-varying household characteristics; 𝑢𝑖  is a time-
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invariant individual fixed effect; and 𝑒𝑖𝑡  is the time-varying error term. We discuss the exact 
specification of this equation in more detail in Chapter III. 
 
Shortcomings of the model 
The above discussion for both the impure altruism and dynamic donation decision models 
are based on utility maximization by an individual. However, our data in Chapters II to IV are at 
the household level. This is not problematic if households behave as a single utility maximizer, 
which Becker (1974) shows would occur under a “benevolent head” of the house. This is not how 
households really behave (Andreoni et al., 2003). Household bargaining models better capture 
observed behavior, and within-family bargains are mediated by several characteristics such as 
relative incomes, demographics, and more (Andreoni et al., 2003). Since our model does not 
account for household bargaining, the conclusions may not accurately translate into our analysis; 
however, the model’s implications which we are instead in are fairly basic and should hold up 
when translating from individual agents to households. 
Most models require simplifications for some tractability. We simplify here by omitting 
different types of giving (e.g. volunteering, bequest, in-kind). This does not allow for directly 
estimating the substitutability of different types of giving, which might be especially important 
when comparing households across income and wealth levels. Such an “altruism budget” is 
discussed in greater detail in Gee and Meer (2019). 
Removing pure altruism from our model simplifies the dynamic donation decision problem, 
but necessarily abstracts away from reality. It may be the case that a potential donor does care 
about the overall level of the public good as well as her own contribution. It may also be the case 
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that warm-glow extends to involuntary donations via taxation (Andreoni 2006) if, for example, 
people get some utility from “contributing” to a public good through taxes paid to the government 
which then provides a service or gives a grant to a nonprofit. In this instance private giving could 
be only partially crowded-out in the presence of the tax subsidy described above. This is discussed 
to a degree in Ottoni-Wilhelm et al. (2017) and Hungerman and Ottoni-Wilhlem (2018). Eckel, 
Grossman, and Johnston (2005) find in a lab experiment that “taxation” almost completely 
crowded-out giving. For our purposes, the simplification is both necessary and sufficient for 
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CHAPTER II 
GIVING ACROSS THE INCOME AND WEALTH DISTRIBUTIONS2 
 
1. Introduction 
The relationship between income, wealth, and charitable giving is of significant policy and 
popular interest, yet there is surprisingly little systematic evidence on the topic. While the press 
tends to highlight findings that suggest that the well-off are stingy (see, among many others, 
Grewal, 2012, and Young, 2017), the claims are questionable due to misuse of data, incomplete 
controls, inappropriate empirical specifications, and a lack of accounting for the influence of 
outliers.3  
Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we provide the most rigorous documentation 
of these relationships to date. We estimate the relationship between pre-tax income, wealth, and 
charitable giving over three measures of generosity: the likelihood of giving, the amount given, 
and the percent of income given. We report means, estimates using ordinary least squares with a 
rich set of household demographic controls, as well as estimates with household fixed effects. Our 
statistical models take care to mitigate the potentially misleading impact of outliers by winsorizing 
households’ percent of income given. This allows us to simultaneously retain the full sample while 
 
2 Previously published with J. Meer in NBER Working Paper 27076, NBER, Cambridge, MA. 
3 As an example, Stern (2013) documents the alleged miserliness of the rich, as measured by the percent of income 
given, using analysis from the Chronicle of Philanthropy discussed in Gipple and Gose (2012). However, that study 
was based on data from the Internal Revenue Service, for households that itemize their giving. Tax-filing units with 
incomes below $50,000 were not included, comprising nearly two-thirds of households. Thus, referring to giving by 
the “poor” is misleading. More importantly, though, itemizing one’s deductions is an endogenous decision. At the 
lower levels of the income range in the study, only about half of tax returns were itemized, while at higher levels, 
nearly all returns were. Almost by definition, those who itemize despite lower incomes have higher levels of charitable 
giving; otherwise, they would not itemize. Further, changes to the tax code under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Acts of 2017 
will significantly reduce the number of households that itemize, making tax data even more problematic for examining 
charitable giving (Meer and Priday, 2019). 
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limiting the degree to which outliers can skew estimation results. While the PSID undersamples 
very-high-income households, it provides the most complete view of charitable giving across the 
income distribution, and includes data on wealth, religiosity, and a number of other important 
correlates of giving that are rarely present in other data.4 
We find that, irrespective of the specification, higher-income and higher-wealth individuals 
are substantially more likely to make donations to charity, and give significantly more. Once 
outliers are properly accounted for, the relationship between the percent of income given and 
income or wealth is generally flat. We also analyze data from the Internal Revenue Service 
Statistics of Income, and find that the very-highest-income individuals tend to give the most as a 
percent of their income. 
One common finding in the literature is the “U-shaped” giving curve: the average 
proportion of income donated is largest at the lowest and highest parts of the income distribution, 
while middle-income groups give the smallest proportion of their income. For example, Clotfelter 
and Steuerle (1981) use IRS tax return data and find a U-shaped curve, which is later corroborated 
with a panel of tax filers by Auten, Clotfelter, Schmalbeck (2000), though only with mean, not 
median, giving.5 However, there is no consensus on this point. Wiepking (2007) documents the 
relationship between income and giving in the Netherlands, finding a flat relationship for the 
likelihood of giving and a negative one on the percent of income given. Schervish and Havens 
(1995a, 1995b) estimate that the giving curve is essentially flat when considering the full sample, 
 
4 Wealth, in particular, is an important determinant of giving (James and Sharpe, 2007), particularly at the end-of-life 
(Bakija, Gale, and Slemrod, 2003; Meer and Rosen, 2013). Households may give not just out of income, but from 
existing wealth. As we show below, a good deal of the ostensibly higher giving levels by low-income households are 
in fact driven by those with high levels of wealth. 
5 Few studies use panel data, and tax return data must be limited to those who itemize in every year. Rooney, Wilhelm, 
Wang, and Han (2019) show that the pattern of charitable giving across individuals when using a single year (or 
repeated cross-section) can be misleading.   
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not just those who donated a positive amount. James and Sharpe (2007) argue that selection bias 
drives the Schervish and Havens results. They find a U-shaped curve but note that it is not a valid 
description of the typical household within each income level: older “low-income” donors with 
higher wealth are responsible for the higher mean giving at the bottom of the income distribution. 
Importantly, other than James and Sharpe (2007), the effect of outliers has largely been ignored in 
this literature which, as we show below, leads to incorrect inference.6  
Experiments, both in the lab and the field, have tackled this question as well. Andreoni, 
Nikiforakis, and Stoop (2017) summarize the literature on the relationship between prosocial 
behavior and income and test it by misdelivering envelopes in higher and lower resource 
neighborhoods. They vary the amount of money in the envelope and the ease with which the false 
recipient can retain it, and find that the rich are more than twice as likely to return the envelope as 
the poor. However, they argue that these results reflect different financial pressure and marginal 
utility of income, and that social preferences are in fact similar. Lab experiments are limited in the 
external validity of their results, as they rely either on the existing (and endogenous) level of 
resources of the subjects (Blanco and Dalton, 2019), or differences in “income” of just a few 
dollars created during the experiment (Duquette and Hargaden, 2019). 
But there is a broader set of questions underlying this discussion: what is generosity, and 
how should it be measured?7 Even taking a limited view – primarily for data-availability reasons 
– that generosity is measured by donations of money, the metric remains unclear. Is it the likelihood 
 
6 Duffy et al. (2015) use the 2001-2009 waves of the PSID to look at how income and wealth affect giving, with 
special attention given to directly comparing the PSID to James and Sharpe (2007). 
7 Gee and Meer (2019) discuss a number of related issues surrounding the notion of an “altruism budget.” Lilley and 
Slonim (2014) and Brown et al. (2019) analyze the substitution between gifts of time and money. 
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of making any donation at all? The amount given? The amount given as a share of one’s income? 
Of one’s total resources, measured as wealth or permanent income? Over what period of time? 
Ultimately, the question of what it means to be generous is philosophical and deeply 
normative. Whether one believes that the consequences of behavior (that is, observed giving) 
determines this state, or whether underlying intentions are more important (as Andreoni, 
Nikiforakis, and Stoop, 2017, do) is a personal matter. We strive to provide a set of facts about the 
empirical relationship between income, wealth, and giving, and leave it to the reader to draw his 
or her own conclusions.  
Different empirical approaches provide insight into very different questions. A simple 
comparison of means (or medians) across the income and wealth distribution shows the most 
straightforward relationship between resources and giving, but compares people who face very 
different circumstances and are at different stages of life. That is, much of the observed relationship 
may be due to other factors that are correlated with both income (or wealth) and giving, so this 
approach shows only whether the sorts of people who have more money are the sorts of people 
who donate more. Ordinary least squares estimates examine the relationship conditioned on the 
effect of these factors, purporting to measure the effect of resources on giving, holding all else 
equal. But unobserved differences between people might still be driving the relationship. Using 
the panel nature of the PSID and including household fixed effects accounts for time-invariant 
characteristics, like altruism, and allows us to estimate how changes in income or wealth relate to 
changes in donative behavior, taking into account both observed and unobserved individual 
characteristics. This approach comes closest to answering how a household’s charitable giving 
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changes when it has more resources. However, as we detail below, even these results should not 
be viewed as completely causal. 
 
2. Data and Specification 
 2.1 Data 
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) is a biennial household survey that collects 
information from the previous year on wealth, income, and a rich set of individual and household 
characteristics. The Center on Philanthropy Panel Study (COPPS), a PSID module begun in 2001, 
includes data on charitable giving to religious entities and ten categories of secular charities. We 
aggregate household donations for our primary analysis and explore possible differences in giving 
to religious and secular causes later. 
The PSID is especially advantageous for analyzing charitable activity. Wilhelm (2006) 
shows that the data are superior to other surveys in coverage of charitable giving and compare well 
to tax return data below relatively high levels of income. Tax return data cover high earners – who 
constitute a large portion of charitable giving – and have higher precision; however, filers only 
appear in the data if they itemize contributions. This effectively results in a sample selected for 
higher income levels, precluding estimation across the broader income distribution. Recent 
changes in the tax code have dramatically reduced the number of households that itemize, limiting 
the value of these data moving forward (Meer and Priday, 2019). Tax return data also do not 
disaggregate giving by charity type. Further, data on wealth are not available on tax returns, 
although wealth is an important determinant of donative behavior (Bakija and Heim, 2011; James 
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and Sharpe, 2007). Below, we show that wealth is important to consider when estimating giving 
behavior across all levels of the income distribution, not just high earners. 
We use nine waves of the PSID spanning 2001–2017, representing every other calendar 
year from 2000 to 2016. The raw sample consists of 76,834 observations across 16,148 households. 
We remove observations with negative income (50) as well as the 2017 Immigrant Refresher (452) 
and the Survey of Economic Opportunity low-income oversample (23,199).8 This leaves us with 
a final sample of 53,133 observations over 10,665 households. Across all household-years, 60 
percent of households report making a donation. Conditional on making a donation, the mean 
(median) gift is $2,749 ($1,000) in 2018 dollars. The mean (median) income of our sample is 
$91,646 ($67,620); the mean (median) wealth is $356,082 ($71,400).9 Table 1 contains the full set 
of summary statistics. 
We examine three outcomes: the probability of giving, the log amount donated, and the 
percent of income donated, focusing on the first two. Outliers pose a particular problem when 
comparing the percent of income given across income levels. James and Sharpe (2007) show that 
the U-shaped giving curve is almost entirely driven by a small number of outliers at the bottom of 
the income distribution. These are often elderly households with high levels of wealth but low 
income. Non-elderly households with transitorily low income, perhaps through business losses, 
 
8 The immigrant refresher added new households to the panel beginning in 2017 to ensure the data remain reflective 
of the current demographic composition of the country. We omit this group as they appear in only one year of our 
data. The SEO subsample was included in the PSID to allow researchers to focus on low-income households. Including 
it in our analysis would oversample the bottom of the income distribution, skew bin specifications, and likely bias 
results. Given that the panel is nationally representative without the oversample, we opt to simplify analysis by 
removing these households instead of weighting the data. 
9 The PSID defines “family income” as the sum of taxable, transfer, and social security income for all family unit 
members. Wealth is the sum of a household’s imputed business and farm equity, transaction accounts, value of debt 
other than main home mortgage or vehicle loans, home equity, other real estate equity, stock equity, vehicle equity, 
IRAs, and other assets. 
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may maintain giving behavior of other, higher-income years. Such “low-income” donors can 
distort means, as we show below. Controlling for wealth and age helps mitigate this problem but 
is not sufficient: outliers may still disproportionately skew means and mislead inference.  
 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 Mean Median Min Max 
Likelihood of giving 60.29%  0 1 
Amount given $1,658 $245 $0 $722,505 
     Winsorized at 20% $1,576 $241 $0 $129,390 
Amount given, conditional $2,749 $1,000 $1 $722,505 
Percent of income given 3.29% 0.32% 0% 369% 
     Winsorized at 10% 1.52% 0.32% 0% 10% 
     Winsorized at 20% 1.65% 0.32% 0% 20% 
     Winsorized at 30% 1.78% 0.32% 0% 30% 
Family Income  $91,646 $67,620 $0 $7,391,006 
Wealth $356,082 $71,400 -$3,374,988 $117,649,300 
Age 47  16 104 
Retired 14.69%  0 1 
Disabled 3.49%  0 1 
Married 55.57%  0 1 
Health of HOH     
   Excellent 20.26%  0 1 
   Very good 35.41%  0 1 
   Good (or worse) 44.33%  0 1 
Number of children 0.75 0 0 11 
Catholic 24.48%  0 1 
Protestant 53.96%  0 1 
Jewish 2.63%  0 1 
Other 2.93%  0 1 
Atheist/Agnostic 15.98%  0 1 
Years of education 13.38 13 0 17 
African American 9.56%  0 1 
Hispanic 9.73%  0 1 
Housing price index $338,939 $300,590 $148,460 $807,040 
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James and Sharpe (2007) address this by simply removing outliers with giving above a 
threshold percent of income. However, this introduces selection bias that is especially problematic 
when utilizing panel data; removing a household’s observation in one year changes within-
household estimation. Instead, we winsorize the percent of income given, a not-uncommon 
approach in other fields but relatively novel in charitable giving (Eckel, Herberich, and Meer, 
2018). We cap the percent of household family income donated at 20 percent: any household-year 
observations donating more than that are assigned a value of 20 percent for percent of income 
given, while all other observations remain unchanged. We also generate the winsorized amount 
given by restricting the maximum amount donated by a household-year to be 20 percent of 
income.10 These approaches allow us to retain all observations while limiting the disproportionate 
impact of outliers on intensive margin outcomes. Table 2 compares winsorized outcomes to their 
non-winsorized counterparts across income quantiles. While about 6 percent of the observations 
in the bottom income ventile are affected by winsorizing at 20 percent of income, this is sufficient 
to reduce the mean percent of income given by a factor of 16.  
 2.2 Specification 
We divide family income and wealth into bins for analysis. Income is broken down into 
evenly-sized ventiles. Because there are a number of observations with negative or zero wealth 
(7,346 and 1,650, respectively), we create separate bins for each of these and divide all positive 
wealth into twenty evenly-sized bins, resulting in twenty-two wealth bins. Table 3 lists the range 




10 For robustness, we consider 10%, 20%, and 30% winsorization when analyzing the percent of income given. The 
log winsorized amount given uses a 20% winsor for all analysis. 
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Discretizing income and wealth into bins reduces the effect of outliers in estimation without 
imposing a functional form on the relationship. However, using bins means that marginal effects 
measure movements across the income or wealth distribution, rather than the change from an 





 Income (in thousands) Wealth (in thousands) 
Bin Min – Max Mean Median Min – Max Mean Median 
1 0 - 11.2 6.1 7 -3,375 - 0 -41.0 -18.0 
2 11.2 - 17.9 14.7 14.8 0 0.0 0.0 
3 17.9 - 24 21 21 0 - 2.3 1.0 1.1 
4 24 - 30.2 27.1 27.1 2.3 - 5.6 3.8 3.8 
5 30.2 - 36 33.1 33.1 5.6 - 10.5 7.9 7.8 
6 36 - 41.8 38.9 38.8 10.5 - 17.5 13.8 13.7 
7 41.8 - 47.6 44.7 44.7 17.6 - 27 22.1 22.1 
8 47.6 - 53.7 50.7 50.7 27 - 38.7 32.6 32.5 
9 53.8 - 60.4 57.1 57.1 38.8 - 54.1 46.1 46.1 
10 60.4 - 67.6 63.9 63.8 54.1 - 72.4 62.8 62.6 
11 67.6 - 74.9 71.1 71 72.5 - 94.7 83.4 83.2 
12 74.9 - 83.0 78.8 78.8 94.8 - 120 107.2 106.6 
13 83.1 - 91.7 87.3 87.3 120 - 150.6 135.2 134.6 
14 91.7 - 102.2 96.8 96.7 150.7 - 189.6 169.3 168.9 
15 102.2 - 113.6 107.6 107.4 189.6 - 239.4 213.2 212.8 
16 113.6 - 128.2 120.5 120.4 239.4 - 301 269 268.9 
17 128.2 - 147.6 137.4 137.3 301 - 380.1 338.7 337.5 
18 147.6 - 176.2 160.9 160.3 380.1 - 492.8 433.3 431.7 
19 176.2 - 233.4 200.4 198.4 492.9 - 662.9 573.9 571.8 
20 233.4 - 7,391 414.4 307.1 662.9 - 957.4 793.9 783.9 
21    957.6 - 1,628 1,228.6 1,191.4 
22    1,628 - 117,649 4,174.6 2,590 
 19 



















1 33.60  1.30 7.91  2.01 5.69  2.56 4.33 
2 1.82  1.12 4.78  1.43 2.26  1.58 0.87 
3 2.07  1.46 5.69  1.76 1.58  1.87 0.75 
4 1.75  1.32 4.40  1.54 1.05  1.62 0.57 
5 1.94  1.33 4.29  1.54 0.94  1.60 0.38 
6 1.79  1.34 4.22  1.57 1.01  1.65 0.64 
7 1.65  1.33 3.84  1.50 0.90  1.56 0.49 
8 1.76  1.50 4.46  1.67 0.57  1.70 0.23 
9 1.72  1.50 4.17  1.67 0.49  1.69 0.26 
10 1.79  1.55 3.99  1.73 0.68  1.76 0.23 
11 1.76  1.59 4.17  1.73 0.34  1.75 0.11 
12 1.82  1.58 3.69  1.69 0.34  1.71 0.19 
13 1.72  1.59 3.01  1.70 0.38  1.72 0.04 
14 1.77  1.63 3.35  1.75 0.30  1.76 0.08 
15 1.82  1.66 3.65  1.78 0.30  1.81 0.19 
16 1.99  1.73 3.47  1.86 0.60  1.90 0.41 
17 1.83  1.74 2.82  1.82 0.19  1.83 0.08 
18 1.96  1.77 3.28  1.89 0.45  1.93 0.30 
19 2.04  1.78 2.82  1.89 0.45  1.92 0.19 




There are well-documented determinants of giving behavior including age, gender, 
education, and race (Bekkers and Wiepking, 2011). We include controls for these characteristics, 
as well as marital status, retirement and disability status, self-reported health, and religious 
affiliation; number of children, a housing price index and its quadratic; as well as state and year 
effects.11 
 
11 Time-invariant characteristics are excluded in fixed effects specifications. Housing price and its quadratic are 
included to take into account the macroeconomic environment (List and Peysakhovich, 2011; Meer, Miller, Wulfsberg, 
2017). 
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Addressing corner solutions – that is, non-donors – is a classic problem in the charitable 
giving literature. The Tobit is frequently used to account for this problem. However, this model 
suffers from tractability problems in the presence of fixed effects, is likely not appropriate when 
zeroes arise from corner solutions rather than true data censoring, and constrains the marginal 
effects on the extensive and intensive margins to be proportional to each other.  This last issue is 
particularly problematic when considering the impact of, say, income, which may have very 
different impacts – possibly of opposite signs – on the likelihood of making a donation and the 
amount given.  
We follow a more recent trend in the literature and treat giving as a two-step process: a 
household first decides if they will give, then, if so, how much they will give. Using ordinary least 
squares (OLS) and fixed effects (FE), we estimate the impact of income and wealth on the 
extensive and intensive margins of giving, then combine the results to find marginal effects on the 
unconditional amount given. 12  Standard errors are clustered at the household level in all 
specifications. 
It is important to note that OLS and FE regressions answer different questions. Marginal 
effects from OLS give the impact on giving of moving across the income and wealth distributions, 
holding all observable characteristics equal. However, unobservable factors – particularly altruism 
– are likely to vary across these distributions, making it difficult to view these results as causal. If, 
for example, the types of people who hold large amounts of wealth tend to be less generous, even 
taking into account observable characteristics, then the giving-wealth gradient will be negative; it 
 
12 See Huck and Rasul (2011) and Meer (2011) for more discussion on the use of this specification for estimates of 
charitable giving responses. Wilhelm (2008) compares the Tobit to other specifications for charitable giving 
estimation. 
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would be incorrect, however, to conclude that higher levels of wealth makes people less generous. 
These specifications, therefore, are better suited to shed light on whether people who have or earn 
more money tend to be more or less generous than those who are observationally similar, but who 
have less money.  
Fixed effects estimates hold time-invariant characteristics, like innate altruism or 
permanent income, fixed; that is, they measure how within-household changes in income or wealth 
impact within-household changes in giving. These estimates are more suited to answer questions 
about whether people become more or less generous as they acquire more money, and the marginal 
propensity to donate out of income or wealth. With controls for wealth and (implicitly) permanent 
income, these should also be viewed as the propensity to donate out of transitory income. 
However, these fixed effects estimates require a nontrivial assumption to be taken as causal, 
namely, that changes in unobserved factors are uncorrelated with financial resources and giving. 
For instance, if a manager becomes more willing to help others both in her work and personal life, 
we might observe that she receives a pay increase and that her charitable giving increases. We 
would mistakenly conclude that the former causes the latter, even though both were caused by the 
change in her attitude and behavior. As such, even fixed effects estimates cannot be viewed as 
being a fully causal accounting of the relationship between income, wealth, and giving. To estimate 
a causal relationship in a compelling way, one would need random (or as-good-as-random) changes 
in income and wealth that are completely unrelated to individuals’ own choices and (unobservable) 
attributes. Only then could we be assured of observing a causal impact on giving. Needless to say, 
it is quite difficult to imagine such circumstances. Further, there is evidence that giving behavior 
varies by the type of income shock (Drouvelis, Isen, and Marx, 2019); varying individuals’ labor 
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income or financial assets at random seems even more far-fetched than observing windfall gains 
at a large scale. 
2.3 Limitations 
 The PSID has very few observations on high-income households, which make up the 
majority of donations and likely behave differently than households in our sample; we cannot 
directly infer the effects on their generosity using our results.13 Tax filing units with earnings over 
$2 million made $63 billion in deductible contributions in 2016, or about 30 percent of the total, 
despite making up about 0.1 percent of the population (IRS, 2018). But there are only two 
observations with income above that level in the PSID in that year.  
Additionally, the PSID samples households every two years and therefore depends on a 
respondent’s ability to recall information from the previous year. Respondents may lie or forget 
about their income, wealth, or charitable donations, though Wilhelm (2006) argues the PSID is 
reliable and superior to other survey data in this respect. The rising popularity of donor-advised 
funds means people may shift charitable giving across years (Andreoni, 2018), which might be 
missed in our biennial data. Our data also covers over a decade of changes in the tax treatment of 
charitable donations; while we do not directly consider the effect of tax laws here, virtually all 
studies find that they do affect giving (see Meer and Priday, 2019, for recent evidence on that 
question).  
The percent of income given is an outcome of particular interest in existing literature and 
popular media. But regression analysis of this outcome has a serious problem: the dependent and 
 
13 A handful of studies have examined giving behavior by high-income prospective donors using field experiments, 
though few consistent conclusions have emerged. See Alston et al. (2018); Kessler, Milkman, and Zhang (2019); and 
Levin, Levitt, and List (2016). 
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independent variables both contain family income. It is somewhat strange to discuss the impact of 
income on the percent of income donated while assuming that the denominator of donations over 
income is held constant. 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Means and Outliers 
We begin by examining mean giving behavior by income (or wealth) bin. This approach 
does answer the simple question of whether giving by higher-resource households differs from 
lower-resource households, but without accounting for any characteristics that might be different 
between those groups that drives philanthropy. 
Figure 1 shows the probability of making a donation in a given year across the income 
distribution. The probability rises monotonically, from 22.3 percent in the lowest bin to 91.0 in the 
highest. The difference between the likelihood of making any donation between the bottom and 
10th bins (37.0 percentage points) is nearly as large as the difference between the 10th bin and the 





















The relationship for wealth in Figure 2 is slightly more complicated. Recall that the lowest bin is 
for those with negative wealth, while bin 2 comprises those with zero wealth. The negative-
wealth bin has an average likelihood of giving of 45.3 percent, as compared to 13.4 percent for 
those with zero wealth. It is not until about the 25th percentile of the positive wealth distribution 
(bin 7) that the likelihood of giving is as high as for those in the bottom bin. This likely reflects 
the different demographics of those in the bottom bin, who are the youngest group on average, 
but are as likely to have a college degree or more as those around the 60th percentile of the 
wealth distribution. Among the ventiles of positive wealth, the likelihood of giving increases 
steadily from 26.8 percent to 90.3 percent. 
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Figure 2: Likelihood of Giving, by Wealth 
 
Notes: Bins 1 and 2 contain households reporting negative and zero wealth, respectively. Bins 3 through 22 are evenly-




Figures 3 and 4 show the mean amount given by income and wealth bin, both 
unconditionally and winsorizing at 20 percent of family income. Unsurprisingly, giving increases 
with higher levels of resources (excepting those with negative wealth). Winsorizing does not 
change most bins’ mean giving very much: the top income bin is reduced to $6,481 from $6,553. 
The lowest-income bins are affected most in relative terms; the bottom bin’s winsorized mean is 






Figure 3: Amount Given, by Income 
 
Notes: Both unadjusted and winsorized estimates include households that reported making no charitable donations. 
Winsorized estimates cap the total amount donated by a household at 20% of family income. See Section 2.1 for a 




Figure 5, which shows the mean percent of income given by bin, illustrates the sensitivity 
of results to the presence of outliers. The unconditional mean percent of income by those in the 
bottom bin is 33.6 percent, including zeroes for the nearly four-fifths of observations in the bin 
who do not give at all. For the other bins, the mean varies between 1.7 and 2.1 percent. Figure 6 
shows percent of giving winsorized at 10, 20, and 30 percent of family income. It is clear that a 
small number of extreme observations drive the mean for the lowest income bin; indeed, the mean 
percent given conditional on making a donation is about 146 percent, and 16 observations have 
giving in excess of 500 percent. Giving as a percent of income tends to be fairly flat across the 
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income distribution when the influence of these outliers is reduced. Table 2 shows that fewer than 
6 percent of observations in that bottom bin are affected by winsorizing, but the difference in 
outcome and interpretation is vast. 
 
 
Figure 4: Amount Given, by Wealth 
 
Notes: Both unadjusted and winsorized estimates include households that reported making no charitable donations. 
Winsorized estimates cap the total amount donated by a household at 20% of family income. See Section 2.1 for a 


















Figure 7 illustrates the mean percent of income given by wealth bin. Once again, the 
influence of extreme outliers is visible: mean giving at the 25th percentile of the wealth distribution 
is 18 percent of income, far higher than any other bin, and driven primarily by a single observation 
(from the lowest income bin). Figure 8 shows the winsorized percent of income given by wealth 
bin. Excluding the negative-wealth bottom bin, the relationship is strongly positive, rising 






Figure 6: Percent of Income Given, Winsorized, by Income 
 
Notes: This figure reports, across income bins, the mean percent of income given winsorized at three levels: 10%, 




As discussed in Section 2.3, one of the primary limitations of the PSID is the lack of data 
on very high-income households, who make up the bulk of the dollars given. Table 4 shows the 
mean percent of giving for those groups, based on the Internal Revenue Service Statistics of 
Income in 2016, which report itemized giving. For simplicity (and as a conservative approach), 
we assume non-itemizers do not donate: in reality, non-itemizers are likely to donate some positive 
amount, which makes our estimates a lower bound. While the results are not directly comparable 
to those from the PSID, the relationship between income and the percent of income given remains 
strongly positive. We do include this calculation for the $200,000-$500,000 bin of adjusted gross 
income, which corresponds roughly to most observations in our top income bin; mean giving for 
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that group is 1.97 percent, not dissimilar to the 1.72 percent we find in the PSID. The likelihood 
of giving for these groups (as defined by itemized giving) is between 86 and 94 percent. Higher 
income bins have higher averages, increasing to 8.6 percent for those with AGIs above $10 million. 
Table 4: Higher-Income Giving 
IRS SOI Income Groups Pr (Giving>0) 
Mean Amount 
Given 
Mean Percent of 
Income Given 
$200,000 - $500,000 85.2% $6,302 1.97% 
$500,000 - $1,000,000 88.5% $16,831 2.32% 
$1,000,000 - $1,500,000 86.4% $36,088 2.78% 
$1,500,000 - $2,000,000 86.8% $53,300 2.91% 
$2,000,000 - $5,000,000 88.3% $108,119 3.44% 
$5,000,000 - $10,000,000 92.2% $308,269 4.32% 
$10,000,000+ 94.6% $2,661,195 8.57% 
Notes: IRS Statistics of Income (SOI) tables report the number of filers in each income group as well as the number 
of itemizers. Means in this table are calculated assuming that non-itemizers do not make any donations. 
Figure 7: Percent of Income Given, by Wealth 
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Figure 8: Percent of Income Given, Winsorized, by Wealth 
Notes: This figure reports, across wealth bins, the mean percent of income given winsorized at three levels: 10%, 20%, 
and 30%. For each of the three levels, the percent of income given by households is capped at that percentage. 
Taken together, these results show the importance of accounting for outliers in this type of 
analysis, as well as the need to account for both income and wealth when considering the giving 
gradient. As noted above, however, these findings document only a strong positive correlation 
between resources and giving behavior. In the next section, we conduct regression analysis to 
examine the degree to which income and wealth affect giving, even after taking into account 
observable individual characteristics that may be correlated with giving. 
 We examine the degree to which observable characteristics explain the income- and wealth-
giving gradients beginning with Figure 9. Each graph includes three sets of coefficients. The first 
reports the marginal effect of being in an income (wealth) bin with no controls other than 
indicators for year, relative to the lowest income (wealth) bin. The second adds our full set of 
covariates: age and its quadratic, indicators for level of education, marital status, state of 
residence, religious denomination, retired and disabled status, indicators for self-reported health 
status, race, gender, and a housing price index and its quadratic. The third set of results adds 
wealth (income) to the controls, thus examining how giving behavior varies across the income 
distribution holding both observable characteristics and wealth (income) constant.  
If, for example, the strong positive relationship between income and giving discussed in 
Section 3.1 is merely a reflection of other characteristics that are correlated with income and 
giving (such as education or religious affiliation), then the second and third set of results will 
show a flat gradient. That is, the independent effect of income on giving, conditional on those 
observables, will be zero. 
Figures 9 through 12 indicate that the relationship remains strongly positive, though these 
controls do account for a good proportion of the impact. In Figure 9, we show results for the 
likelihood of giving. Only including year effects, the difference between the top and bottom 
income ventiles is 68.2 percentage points, as expected from the differences in means. 
Adding observable characteristics maintains the monotonic relationship, but reduces this 
difference to 38.7 percentage points. That is, the likelihood of giving is much higher for 
individuals who are observably similar but have higher incomes, on average. Adding a set of 
indicators for wealth bin further flattens the relationship, though those in the top bin are still 
more than 27 percentage points 
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3.2 Ordinary Least Squares Estimates 
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more likely to make a donation than those in the bottom. The differences between the very top 
income bins are particularly reduced, with the propensity to make a donation roughly the same 
after the 80th percentile of income. 
Figure 9: OLS, Likelihood of Giving, by Income 
Notes: This figure displays the coefficients for each income bin from OLS regressions. All specifications include 
income bin and year indicators; the lowest income bin is omitted for comparison. Covariates include age and its 
quadratic, indicators for level of education, marital status, state of residence, religion, retired and disabled status, 
indicators for self-reported health status, race, gender, and a housing price index and its quadratic. Error bars represent 
the 95% confidence interval. Robust standard errors are clustered at the household level. 
Similarly, Figure 10 shows the relationship between wealth and the likelihood of giving. 
Interestingly, the higher likelihood of giving by those with negative wealth remains large and 
significant relative to those with low levels of wealth when including controls (though the 
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difference is reduced by a large margin), suggesting that there is more to this correlation than 
simply age, education, and other observable characteristics. The top wealth bin is about 15 
percentage points more likely to give than those with negative wealth (and 29 percentage points 
more likely to give than those with zero wealth) when including the full set of controls. Again, the 
relationship tends to flatten out past the 70th percentile of the positive wealth distribution. 
Figure 10: OLS, Likelihood of Giving, by Wealth 
Notes: This figure displays the coefficients for each wealth bin from OLS regressions. All specifications include 
wealth bin and year indicators; the lowest (negative) wealth bin is omitted for comparison. Covariates include age and 
its quadratic, indicators for level of education, marital status, state of residence, religion, retired and disabled status, 
indicators for self-reported health status, race, gender, and a housing price index and its quadratic. Error bars represent 
the 95% confidence interval. Robust standard errors are clustered at the household level. 
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Figure 11: OLS, Unconditional Winsorized Amount Given, by Income 
Notes: This figure displays the coefficients for each income bin from OLS regressions combining the extensive and 
intensive margins. All specifications include income bin and year indicators; the lowest income bin is omitted for 
comparison. Covariates include age and its quadratic, indicators for level of education, marital status, state of residence, 
religion, retired and disabled status, indicators for self-reported health status, race, gender, and a housing price index 
and its quadratic. Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval. Robust standard errors are clustered at the 
household level. 
In Figures 11 and 12, we turn to effects on the unconditional amount of given, winsorized 
at 20 percent of family income. As described in Section 2.2, we estimate the extensive and 
intensive margins separately and then combine them to obtain unconditional estimates. Once again, 
the income-giving gradient is strongly positive and, in this case, only somewhat attenuated by the 
inclusion of observable characteristics, including wealth. Those in the top income bin give about 
16 times more, on average, than those in the bottom income bin; of course, the mean income in 
the top bin is 68 times that of the bottom bin. In Figure 12, the wealth-giving gradient is similarly 
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positive, with those in top wealth bin giving about 380 percent more than those with negative 
wealth, and about 1300 percent more than those with zero wealth. 
Figure 12: OLS, Unconditional Winsorized Amount Given, by Wealth 
Notes: This figure displays the coefficients for each wealth bin from OLS regressions combining the extensive and 
intensive margins. All specifications include wealth bin and year indicators; the lowest wealth bin (negative wealth) 
is omitted for comparison. Covariates include age and its quadratic, indicators for level of education, marital status, 
state of residence, religion, retired and disabled status, indicators for self-reported health status, race, gender, and a 
housing price index and its quadratic. Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval. Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the household level. 
As discussed above, it is unclear how best to interpret the effects of income on the percent 
of income given. Nevertheless, for comparison with previous findings, we show these results by 
income and wealth bin, respectively, in Figures A-1 and A-2, winsorizing at 10, 20, and 30 percent 
of family income and including wealth and demographic controls. The results do not change 
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meaningfully across these levels of winsorizing, suggesting that it is a small number of extreme 
outliers that drive the conclusions often seen in the popular press. The percent of income given 
increases with income, plateauing at about median income, before reducing somewhat for the very 
top income bin. The results for wealth are clearer: the percent of income given rises monotonically 
with wealth (excluding those with negative wealth), peaking at about two percentage points higher 
for the top wealth bin relative to those with negative wealth.  
The findings are stark: generosity – as reflected by donations – increases with greater 
income and wealth. But these results could still reflect unobserved heterogeneity, necessitating 
stronger controls. We therefore now turn to estimates with individual fixed effects. 
3.3 Fixed Effects Estimates 
As discussed above, fixed effects estimates account for unobservable, time-invariant 
attributes, including innate altruism. While these are not necessarily consistent estimates of the 
underlying marginal propensity to donate out of additional income or wealth, they are closer to 
that interpretation than the OLS estimates. Suppose, for example, unobserved altruism was 
correlated with both income and giving but not with the observable characteristics listed in Section 
3.2. Then those OLS estimates would still reflect spurious correlation, while estimates including 
fixed effects would show no relationship between resources and giving.  
In Figures 13 and 14, we examine the effects of income and wealth on the likelihood of 
giving. The gradient remains very positive, as with OLS, though the differences between bins are 
unsurprisingly much smaller. For example, including time-varying covariates and wealth, an 
individual in the top income bin is 13 percentage points more likely to make a donation than that 
individual would be had he or she been in the bottom income bin. Note further that the difference 
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between the three specifications is much smaller than with OLS, since the individual fixed effects 
account for so much of the variation picked up by the covariates in Figure 9. The relationship is 
similarly positive for wealth. In Figure 14, with those in the top wealth bin are 6.6 percentage 
points more likely to give than if they had been in the negative wealth bin, and 11.9 percentage 
points more likely than if they had zero wealth. 
Figure 13: Fixed Effects, Likelihood of Giving, by Income 
Notes: This figure displays the coefficients for each income bin from fixed effects panel regressions. All specifications 
include income bin and year indicators; the lowest income bin is omitted for comparison. Time-invariant covariates 
from the above OLS regressions are excluded. Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval. Robust standard 
errors are clustered at the household level. 
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Figure 14: Fixed Effects, Likelihood of Giving, by Wealth 
 
Notes: This figure displays the coefficients for each wealth bin from fixed effects panel regressions. All specifications 
include wealth bin and year indicators; the lowest wealth bin (negative wealth) is omitted for comparison. Time-
invariant covariates from the above OLS regressions are excluded. Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval. 




Figures 15 and 16 examine the effect on the unconditional amount given. Again, the 
gradient remains strongly positive, with those in the top income bin giving about 420 percent more 
than they would have had they been in the bottom income bin. And the same holds for higher levels 
of wealth: those in the top wealth bin give, on average, 100 percent more than they would have 
had they had negative wealth.14 
 
14 The percent of income results (Figures A-3 and A-4) are difficult to interpret, especially for the effect of income. In 
contrast to the OLS results and, indeed, those for wealth, the effects of income show a strong negative relationship 
with magnitudes that cannot be reconciled with the underlying data. We are unable to offer an explanation other than 
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Figure 15: Fixed Effects, Unconditional Winsorized Amount Given, by Income 
 
Notes: This figure displays the coefficients for each income bin from fixed effects panel regressions combining the 
extensive and intensive margins. All specifications include income bin and year indicators; the lowest income bin is 
omitted for comparison. Time-invariant covariates from the above OLS regressions are excluded. Error bars represent 




The fixed effects estimates suggest that unobserved heterogeneity is not entirely driving 
the positive relationship between income (wealth) and donative behavior. By these measures, 
individuals appear to become more generous as their resources increase, though we caution against 






that the marginal effect of changing income bins on the percent of income given, estimated within household, is a 
sufficiently muddled metric that it yields uninterpretable results. 
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Figure 16: Fixed Effects, Unconditional Winsorized Amount Given, by Wealth 
 
Notes: This figure displays the coefficients for each wealth bin from fixed effects panel regressions combining the 
extensive and intensive margins. All specifications include wealth bin and year indicators; the lowest wealth bin 
(negative wealth) is omitted for comparison. Time-invariant covariates from the above OLS regressions are excluded. 




3.4 Religious and Secular Giving 
The distribution of giving between religious and secular causes is of independent interest. 
The popular conception is that giving by lower-income families is tilted towards religious causes, 
while higher-income families give to the arts and education.15 The distinction between religious 
 
15  Iannaccone (1988) provides a theory explaining why the intensity of sectarian religious belief is negatively 
correlated with income, which naturally implies low-income households will give a larger proportion of their 
donatable resources to religious groups rather than secular, compared to higher-income groups. Schervish and Havens 
(1995a) and Jencks (1987) offer this religious commitment as an explanation for why low-income households give 
larger proportions of their income than middle- and high-income households.  
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and secular giving is difficult to make at times, but the PSID asks respondents to separate 
religiously-affiliated charities that work on education or human services issues from religious 
organizations that provide religious services and the like, designating the former as secular.  
 
 
Figure 17: Percent of Giving to Religious Causes, by Income 
 
Notes: Secular giving is aggregated across all charitable causes. Giving to religiously-affiliated or religiously-run 
charities, such as soup kitchens, hospitals, and schools, are included in secular giving. Religious giving is defined as 
donations to religious organizations (e.g. churches, mosques). Estimates are calculated by taking mean share of giving 




In Figures 17 and 18, we examine the mean percent of giving (conditional on making 
donations) that accrues to religious causes. The share does trend downward over the income 
distribution, though somewhat surprisingly, the lowest income bin has a smaller share of giving 
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going to religious causes than all but the top few. For the second income bin, about 56 percent of 
giving is, on average, dedicated to religious causes; for the middle of the distribution, it is about 
48 percent, falling to 40 percent and 33 percent for the top two bins, respectively. Only about 25 
(30) percent of households that make a gift in the bottom (second) income bin give all of their 
donations to religious causes. The relationship between wealth and share directed to religious 
causes in Figure 18 is similar, with a slight decline at the top wealth bins. 
 
 
Figure 18: Percent of Giving to Religious Causes, by Wealth 
 
Notes: Secular giving is aggregated across all charitable causes. Giving to religiously-affiliated or religiously-run 
charities, such as soup kitchens, hospitals, and schools, are included in secular giving. Religious giving is defined as 
donations to religious organizations (e.g. churches, mosques). Estimates are calculated by taking mean share of giving 





Secular giving in the PSID is divided into ten categories: health, education, art, youth 
services, community/neighborhood services, basic needs, international (humanitarian) aid, 
environment, combined purpose organizations, and other. The 2001 wave of the PSID records 
secular giving in four categories: basic needs, health, education, and combined purpose. We omit 
data from the 2001 wave from Figures 19 and 20 to preserve comparability.  
 
 
Figure 19: Percent of Giving to Cause Types, by Income 
 
Notes: Estimates are calculated as mean proportions of total giving to each charity type, conditional on making 
donations, within each bin. Religious giving is defined as donations to religious organizations (e.g. churches, mosques). 
The ten categories of secular giving included in the PSID have been grouped as: art and education, basic needs, health, 
youth and community/neighborhood services, international aid and environment, and combined purpose/other 







Figure 20: Percent of Giving to Cause Types, by Wealth 
 
Notes: Estimates are calculated as mean proportions of total giving to each charity type, conditional on making 
donations, within each bin. Religious giving is defined as donations to religious organizations (e.g. churches, mosques). 
The ten categories of secular giving included in the PSID have been grouped as: art and education, basic needs, health, 
youth and community/neighborhood services, international aid and environment, and combined purpose/other 




In Figures 19 and 20, we break down secular giving into six groups for comparison. 
Households at the top of income distribution give a larger proportion of their total donations to the 
arts and education than low- and middle-income households. However, it is untrue that high-
income households direct more of their giving to arts and education than to religion. For the top 
income bin, about 33 percent of giving was to religious organizations while just over 11 percent 
of giving was to arts- or education-focused nonprofits. For most other causes, giving is 
proportionally similar across the income distribution. Figure 20 tells a similar story for wealth. 
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High-wealth households give a larger proportion to art and education compared to lower-wealth 
households, but they still direct significantly more of their giving towards religious organizations.  
 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper, we present systematic evidence on the relationship between income, wealth, 
and giving. We show that outliers drive the traditional “U-shaped” percent of income given curve. 
By winsorizing to address these outliers, we show that the percent of income given is actually 
fairly flat across the income distribution for those making less than $500,000. 
We also estimate effects on the extensive and intensive margins of giving in a manner that 
does not impose restrictions on their relationship, as the Tobit does. In contrast to some of the 
previous academic research and much of the popular discourse on the topic, we find a strongly 
positive relationship between resources and giving. We include household-level fixed effects to 
account for time-invariant, unobserved differences that might bias cross-sectional analyses. We 
note, however, that our results – even those including fixed effects – cannot necessarily be viewed 
as the causal impact on giving of additional income or wealth for an individual. Further, the 
definition of “generosity” that we use is, by necessity, limited, and we take no normative stance 
on the appropriate interpretation thereof. That said, we believe that our evidence shifts the burden 
of proof to those who claim that high-income and -wealth individuals are less generous than their 
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TAX PRICES AND CHARITABLE GIVING:  
PROJECTED CHANGES IN DONATIONS UNDER THE 2017 TCJA16 
 
1. Introduction 
 The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA) made significant changes to the rate structure 
of the Internal Revenue Code of the United States.17 One of the many activities potentially affected 
by this change in marginal tax rates – and, in particular, the near-doubling of the standard deduction 
– is charitable giving. At the time of its debate and passage, many commentators asserted that 
charitable giving would be reduced (see, e.g. McQueeney, 2017). Indeed, recently-released 
aggregate data does indicate a decline of 3.4 percent in giving by individuals in 2018 (GivingUSA, 
2019), though drawing a direct causal relationship is difficult because of other changes in 
economic conditions and incentives to shift giving into the 2017 tax year. Charitable giving is 
sensitive to macroeconomic conditions (List and Peysakhovich, 2011; Meer, Miller, Wulfsberg, 
2017), and this likely impacted giving (Osili and Zarins, 2019). 
By reducing marginal tax rates by 1 to 4 percentage points, the TCJA increases the tax price 
of giving for those who itemize their deductions. For those households, each dollar donated to a 
 
16 Previously published with J. Meer in Tax Policy & the Economy, Vol. 34, pp. 113-138, Robert Moffitt, ed. NBER. 
17 For procedural reasons, the formal title of the bill is “Act to provide for reconciliation pursuant to titles II and V of 
the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2018.” We will refer to it by its colloquial name throughout for 
brevity. Other major provisions in the individual income tax code include the elimination of the personal exemption 
(and therefore its phase-out), the elimination of the Pease phase-out for itemized deductions, a cap on the deduction 
for state and local taxes, an increase in the child tax credit, and the use of chained CPI to index provisions of the tax 
code. The maximum amount of the charitable giving deduction was increased from 50% of Adjusted Gross Income to 
60%, which Duquette (2019a) suggests will increase charitable giving by high-income donors substantially. Changes 
were also made to the estate tax, which may affect charitable bequests (see Bakija, Gale, and Slemrod, 2003; Joulfaian, 
1991; and Meer and Rosen, 2013).  
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qualifying charity reduces their taxable income by one dollar, thus lowering their tax liability by 
their marginal tax rate. More importantly, though, the increase in the standard deduction means 
that far fewer households are expected to itemize, thus eliminating the direct tax incentive to make 
a charitable donation; projections suggest that the proportion of itemizing tax filing units will fall 
from about 25 percent to about 11 or 12 percent (Gale et al., 2018; Joint Committee on Taxation, 
2018).  
 The deduction for charitable giving has existed since the War Revenue Act of 1917, with 
the justification that charitable organizations may provide valuable societal services while being 
more responsive than the government. Prior to the TCJA, this provision reduced federal income 
tax revenue by approximately $57 billion, with about 70 percent of that benefit accruing to 
households earning over $200,000 per year. Estimates of the reduction in itemized giving suggest 
that the effects of this provision fell to about $40 billion in 2018 (JCT 2017, 2018). For a discussion 
of tax policy and charitable giving, see Bakija (2013), Clotfelter (2016), and Duquette (2019b); 
for a broader look at motivations for philanthropy, see Bekkers and Wiepking (2012) and Gee and 
Meer (2019).  
 We provide new estimates of the tax price elasticity of charitable giving using nine waves 
of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), spanning 2001-2017, and apply these estimates 
to the provisions of the TCJA; we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of these data below. 
Because of the large number of households that make no donations, we separately estimate the 
likelihood of giving and the amount given conditional on making a donation using fixed effects 
models and combine these estimates for an overall effect on donations. Further, since the tax price 
of giving is endogenous – that is, those who donate large amounts may lower their marginal tax 
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rates, leading to a spurious correlation – we follow much of the existing literature and instrument 
with the “first-dollar price.” That is, we estimate what the household’s price of giving would have 
been without any donations and use that as a proxy for the actual price of giving. 
We also examine for the marginal propensity to donate from income (see Meer and Priday, 
2019, for more details). The TCJA lowered tax liability for about 80 percent of households, with 
an average reduction of about $1,600 for all tax units (Gale et al., 2018). The increase in disposable 
income should increase giving to some degree, offsetting some of the reduction due to an increase 
in the tax price. Previous academic research on this topic has focused on the direct impact of a 
change in the tax price of giving, holding all else constant. But a full accounting of the impact of 
the TCJA on giving should include this change in income.18 
 In line with the previous literature, we find that charitable giving is responsive to tax 
incentives. A 10 percent increase in the price of giving (equivalent to a reduction in marginal tax 
rates from, for example, 30 percent to 23 percent) is expected to reduce giving by 10.7 percent, 
though effects are smaller for those who continue to itemize. We find that the marginal propensity 
to donate is small and, for most households, the size of the increase in disposable income from the 
TCJA is sufficiently low that this term does not affect the overall estimates very much.19 Given 
that the TCJA is expected to significantly alter itemizing behavior, we estimate our results 
separately for households that always itemize and those that switch; we find that switchers tend to 
 
18 There are several thorough and in-depth projections of the TCJA’s effect on charitable giving, including Brill and 
Choe (2018), Gleckman (2018), and IUPUI (2017, 2019). These estimates suggest a reduction of about 4-5% in 
individual giving. However, these studies draw on an older literature for estimates of the tax price elasticity of giving 
and do not account for potentially countervailing income effects. 
19 Our fixed effects specification controls for permanent income, and we include controls for wealth, so this might 
best be viewed as the marginal propensity to donate from transitory income. Further details are in Meer and Priday 
(2019). 
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be more sensitive to the tax price. We also find that there are some lagged effects, suggesting that 
taxpayers take some time to adjust their giving to changes in the tax code. 
 Of course, our work is subject to limitations. In particular, the PSID does not include many 
very high earners, who make a large proportion of charitable donations. For example, tax units 
with earnings over $2 million made $63 billion in deductible contributions in 2016, or about 30 
percent of the total, despite making up about 0.1 percent of the population (IRS, 2018). But there 
are only two such observations in the PSID in that year. We apply our estimates to data from the 
Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income to provide some indication of expected effects on 
these households.  
 In Section 2, we briefly review the literature on tax incentives for charitable giving. In 
Section 3, we discuss the PSID and its advantages and disadvantages for this type of analysis, as 
well as our econometric specification. Section 4 lays out the results, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Previous Literature 
 The rich literature on the impact of tax policy on charitable giving stretches back over a 
half-century.20 Even limiting the focus to papers that use data from the United States, there is huge 
variety: the use of administrative tax data vs. surveys, panel data vs. cross-sections, approaches to 
dealing with those who do not make a donation, the inclusion of bequest giving, breakdowns by 
income level, and the examination of permanent vs. transitory changes in tax prices and income. 
Peloza and Steel (2005) provide a meta-analysis of sixty-nine papers from this earlier literature 
and find a weighted average of elasticities of about -1.1 when excluding outliers. More recently, 
 
20 See, for example, Taussig (1967), Feldstein (1975), Feldstein and Clotfelter (1976), Clotfelter (1980), Reece and 
Zieschang (1985), Feenberg (1987), Randolph (1995), Auten, Sieg, and Clotfelter (2002), among many others. 
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Bakija and Heim (2011) use variation in federal and state tax rates on a panel of high-income 
taxpayers between 1979 and 2006, where nearly all of the observations in the sample have a 
positive amount of charitable giving. They find that giving is responsive to its tax price, as well as 
evidence that households adjust to tax changes over time.  
Duquette (2016) takes a different approach, examining charities’ revenues rather than 
individuals’ donations. He finds significantly larger estimates of the tax price of giving, with an 
elasticity of about -4 and meaningful differences across types of charities.21 Backus and Grant 
(2019), using earlier waves of the PSID, argue that the inclusion of a control for itemizing status 
is important to account for endogeneity arising from idiosyncratic shocks to giving that change 
itemization. They concede, though, that if the act of itemizing has its own direct effect on giving, 
then this term will also reflect a price effect.22 This potential “itemization effect” is not novel 
(Boskin and Feldstein, 1977), but has received little attention in the literature, likely because of 
the difficulty in providing causal estimates. Ottoni-Wilhelm and Hungerman (2007) address it by 
separately estimating price elasticities for households that always itemize and those that switch 
between itemizing and not itemizing. We follow their approach, which is particularly valuable in 
analyzing the TCJA and its large impact on the likelihood of itemizing. They find that “switchers” 
are much more price-elastic than always-itemizers. 23  In later work, Hungerman and Ottoni-
 
21 Meer (2014) discusses the effects of the price of giving in different contexts, including the impact of fundraising or 
administrative costs and matches, and compares these estimates to the tax price elasticity of giving. Hungerman and 
Ottoni-Wilhelm (2016) directly compare tax- and match-elasticities for a state-level tax incentive for giving to higher 
education. 
22 The inclusion of this term changes our estimated elasticity from -1.07 to -0.66, but interpretation of this estimate is 
unclear given the potential “itemization effect.” 
23 They also disaggregate giving into religious and secular causes, though the differences in price elasticities are not 
necessarily significant. Brooks (2007) finds that the price elasticity of giving differs across causes. 
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Wilhelm (2016) use a state-level tax credit for donations to educational institutions and find a 
lower elasticity than the rest of the literature, with estimates around -0.2. 
Recent evidence from other countries also suggests that charitable contributions are 
sensitive to their tax treatment. Adena (2014) and Bönke and Werdt (2015) find that higher-income 
households in Germany have relatively high tax-price elasticities. Almunia, Lockwood, and Scharf 
(2018) find elasticities of about -0.35 in the United Kingdom, while Fack and Landais (2010) find 
elasticities of -0.2 to -0.6 from France’s generous tax subsidies. 
A frequently-discussed issue in the literature is that short-run responses to tax incentives 
may be larger than long-run responses because individuals may change the timing of their giving 
to take advantage of changes in the law (Randolph, 1995; Auten, Sieg, Clotfelter, 2002; Bakija and 
Heim, 2011). Ottoni-Wilhelm and Hungerman (2007) argue that policymaking in recent years, 
with tax bills going into effect on short notice and sometimes retroactively, make it difficult for 
households to anticipate future tax rates. But as discussed in Section 3.3, this issue may be a 
particular concern with the response to the TCJA. 
 
3. Data and Specification  
3.1  Data 
 The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) is a biennial household survey that collects 
information from the previous year on wealth, income sources, and a rich set of household 
characteristics. The Center on Philanthropy Panel Study (COPPS) data is a PSID module that 
includes charitable activity to religious and ten types of secular charities. We aggregate household 
giving to all charities for our primary analysis. 
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 The PSID is especially advantageous for analyzing charitable activity. Wilhelm (2006) 
shows that the data are superior to other surveys, and compare well to tax return data below 
relatively high levels of income. While tax return data have the advantage of being more precise 
and covering high earners, donations only appear in tax data if the household itemizes. This 
excludes over two-thirds of tax filing units and results in a sample selected for higher income levels. 
This selection precludes estimating tax price elasticities of giving for households who itemize in 
some years but not in others. Unlike the PSID, tax return data do not disaggregate giving by charity 
type. Further, data on wealth are not available on tax returns, which is an important determinant of 
donative behavior (Bakija and Heim, 2011; James and Sharpe, 2007).24  
We use nine waves of the PSID spanning 2001-2017. These represent every other calendar 
year from 2000-2016. The raw sample has 16,146 households with 76,784 household-year 
observations. We remove 166 observations with negative net-of-tax income. We also remove the 
low income Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO) oversample and the 2017 Immigrant 
Refresher.25 Consistent with prior literature on tax price elasticities, we omit households that are 
“endogenous itemizers” – those who would not itemize if they had zero charitable contributions 
(Clotfelter, 1980; Backus and Grant, 2019; Ottoni-Wilhelm and Hungerman, 2007). These 
households are more likely to be making the decisions of whether to itemize and how much to 
donate simultaneously; their inclusion in the estimation makes elasticities appear larger in 
magnitude than they are in reality. There are 1,776 endogenous itemizer observations. To avoid 
 
24 Duquette (2018) and Splinter (2019) discuss the impact of inequality on donations by high-income donors. 
25 The 2017 Immigrant Refresher was intended to update the PSID sample to be more representative of the US 
demographic composition, but only appears for one year in our data. The SEO oversamples low income households 
which disproportionately lowers the average income of our sample. Combined, omitting them from our sample 
removes 23,651 observations. Including the oversample and refresher do not change the total elasticity estimate by a 
meaningful amount. 
 57 
introducing more measurement error from selectively eliminating observations, we remove all 
observations for a household that ever endogenously itemized (7,026 observations or 951 
households).26 This leaves us with a final sample of 45,941 observations for 9,711 households. 
Across all household-years, 56% of households make a donation. Conditional on making a 
donation, the average (median) gift is $2,045 ($750). The mean (median) income of our sample is 
$85,696 ($61,158). Table 1 shows summary statistics of the data. 
High-income households constitute a large portion of annual donations but are not sampled 
in large numbers in the PSID. To make predictions about changes in giving for these households, 
we use summary information on tax returns from the IRS Statistics of Income (SOI).27 These tables 
provide estimates of the number of filers, totals from various income sources, and itemized 
deductions stated in individual income tax returns. Donations are only observed in tax data if the 
filer itemizes deductions, which most high earners do. We use these tables to generate a 
“representative tax filing unit” within four bins of adjusted gross income: $500k - $1M, $1M - 











26 We also estimate our specifications including these observations. Counterintuitively, we find that giving is less 
responsive with respect to the tax respect including this sample, with an elasticity of -0.79. 




Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 Mean Median Min Max 
Likelihood of giving 55.59%  0 1 
Amount given $1,135 $117 $0 $722,505 
Amount given, conditional $2,045 $750 $1 $722,505 
   (Winsorized at 99th percentile) $1,843 $750 $1 $18,530 
Calculated itemization status 24.60%  0 1 
Tax price 0.9373 1 0.4763 1.0465 
Zero-dollar tax price 0.9371 1 0.4763 1.0465 
Family Income  $85,696 $61,158 $0 $7,391,005 
Net-of-Tax Income $74,348 $56,742 $0 $4,819,667 
Wealth $287,982 $53,366 -$2,436,000 $117,649,300 
Age 45.82 43 16 104 
Retired 0.1432  0 1 
Disabled 0.0396  0 1 
Married 0.5166  0 1 
Health of HOH     
   Excellent 0.1958  0 1 
   Very good 0.3458  0 1 
   Good to Poor 0.4584  0 1 
Number of children 0.759 0 0 11 
Catholic 0.2417  0 1 
Protestant 0.5031  0 1 
Jewish 0.0243  0 1 
Other 0.0266  0 1 
Atheist/Agnostic 0.1668  0 1 
Housing price index $340,683 $301,900 $148,460 $807,040 
Note: PSID samples in every odd year between 2001 and 2017 are included, corresponding to the previous calendar 
year. The Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO) oversample and 2016 Immigrant Supplement are removed from 




We use the National Bureau of Economic Research’s TAXSIM program to calculate tax 
liability for each tax filing year in our sample (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993). TAXSIM uses tax-
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relevant household characteristics, sources of income, and deductions to calculate state and federal 
tax rates and liabilities. We use these tax liabilities to construct the tax price of giving for household 
i in year t. In the literature, this is typically addressed by calculating the price as 1 − 𝐼𝑖𝑡𝜏𝑖𝑡, where 
𝐼𝑖𝑡 is a binary variable equal to one if household i itemizes in year t and 𝜏𝑖𝑡 is the marginal tax rate. 
Calculating 𝜏𝑖𝑡 is not always straightforward, however, because of phase-ins and phase-outs of 
various credits and deductions, state treatments of charitable contributions, interactions with state 
taxes, and other vagaries of the tax code. 28  TAXSIM accounts for all these components 
simultaneously when estimating tax liability. We therefore estimate the tax price of giving as: 





where 𝐿𝑖𝑡 is the tax liability for household i in year t and 𝐿𝑖𝑡
′  is the tax liability calculated after 
adding $100 to charitable donations. 𝐿𝑖𝑡
′  therefore reflects the estimated tax burden less the 
marginal tax benefit of donating.29 Donating more will never increase tax liability, so 𝐿𝑖𝑡
′  is always 
less than 𝐿𝑖𝑡, which bounds 𝑃𝑖𝑡 ∈ [0,1].30 
However, 𝐿𝑖𝑡 is endogenous because households can increase donations enough to move 
into a lower tax bracket. This, in turn, makes 𝑃𝑖𝑡  endogenous, as noted by Auten, Sieg, and 
Clotfelter (2002). We address this issue by modifying a standard approach in this literature: by 
 
28 There are 42 states that allow charitable deductions on state tax returns and 6 states that allow federal taxes to be 
deducted. See Duquette et al. (2019) for a discussion of the efficacy of state tax incentives for charitable giving. 
29 We also estimated the models with the more-traditional approach of calculating marginal tax rates to find the tax 
price of giving. Results were similar, though there were a few unusual marginal tax rates due to notches, kinks, and 
phase-outs. 
30 The small number of households who are predicted to begin itemizing when $100 is added to their charitable 
contributions are given a price of 1. 
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constructing a “zero-dollar” rate where 𝐿𝑖𝑡 is calculated with giving set to zero and 𝐿𝑖𝑡
′  with giving 
set to $100 for i in t.31 The corresponding zero-dollar price is used to instrument for the tax price.32 
The PSID asks respondents whether or not they itemized deductions on their taxes. Ottoni-
Wilhelm and Hungerman (2007) note that this itemization status is measured with error, especially 
for low-income respondents who over-report itemizing. We instead use itemization status 
calculated by TAXSIM.33 Though the calculated itemization status likely also introduces some 
measurement error, we avoid the endogeneity of self-reporting.  
We use a similar approach in TAXSIM with high-income bins from the SOI data as with 
PSID. We observe the percentage of each AGI bin that itemizes its deductions. We use TAXSIM 
to estimate a single 𝐿𝑖𝑡 and 𝐿𝑖𝑡
′  for the itemizers within each bin to find the tax prices because only 
itemizers have a charitable contributions average listed. For simplicity, we assume that non-
itemizers have $0 of itemizable expenses and a tax price of 1. Section 4.3 discusses in more detail 
how these estimates are applied. 
We use the 2017 wave (2016 tax year) of the PSID to predict changes in giving from the 
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA). The TCJA affected giving primarily through two channels: the 
standard deduction nearly doubled for all filers, removing the incentive to itemize for large 
portions of itemizers, and changing marginal tax rates. Consistent with other projections, we see 
the proportion of itemizers go from 19.9 percent in 2016 to an estimated 7.0 percent under our 
 
31 See Ottoni-Wilhelm and Hungerman (2007), Auten, Sieg, Clotfelter (2002), Backus and Grant (2019), among others. 
32 About 5 percent of the sample has a zero-dollar tax price that differs from its actual tax price. This is not an 
uncommon issue in this literature, as discussed by Backus and Grant (2019). 
33 Reported and calculated itemization status agree for 80 percent of observations in our sample. 15 percent report 
itemizing when we calculate that they shouldn’t have and 5 percent report not itemizing when they should have. 
Benzarti (2019) finds that some taxpayers don’t itemize even when it is advantageous, due to high compliance costs.  
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TCJA counterfactual; the overall rates are lower than those found by others because many itemizers 
have incomes at levels that are not well-represented in the PSID.  
3.2  Specification 
 We estimate the impact of income and the tax price of giving on the extensive and intensive 
margins of giving separately, then combine the estimates, using two-stage least squares with 
household and year fixed effects for each specification. Other controls include bins for the level of 
household wealth; indicators for marital status, whether the head of the household is retired or 
disabled, his or her self-reported health status, and religious affiliation; continuous variables for 
household head’s age and its quadratic, number of children, a housing price index and its quadratic; 
as well as state and year effects.  
Previous work using samples of high-income taxpayers had few non-givers (e.g. Bakija 
and Heim, 2011) and did not have to address the well-known problems with observations censored 
at zero. Including non-donors in the analysis directly may bias findings towards less elastic 
estimates. Other work uses the Tobit (e.g. Brooks, 2007), though this model suffers from 
tractability problems with fixed effects, is likely not appropriate when zeroes arise from corner 
solutions rather than true data censoring, and constrains the marginal effects on the extensive and 
intensive margins to be related by a constant. This last issue is particularly problematic when 
considering the impact of, say, income, which may have very different impacts on the likelihood 
of making a donation and the amount given. The two-part hurdle model separates the decision of 
whether to give from how much to give conditional on making a donation.34 Standard errors are 
clustered at the household level. 
 
34 See Huck and Rasul (2011) and Meer (2011) for more discussion on the use of this specification for estimates of 
charitable giving responses; Wilhelm (2008) compares the Tobit to other specifications for charitable giving 
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 The inclusion of household fixed effects controls for time-invariant factors that are 
correlated with giving and the tax price. The most important of these may be unobserved altruism. 
For example, more generous individuals may be more likely to succeed in the workplace, leading 
to a spurious correlation between donations, income, and tax rates. Changes in altruistic behavior 
that are correlated with changes in income may still lead to spurious correlation, though, such as 
if a pay raise coincides with a need to signal generosity to others. Additionally, these fixed effects 
control, in part, for permanent income. We also include controls for household wealth to further 
account for permanent income. 
 Since the amount of charitable giving can affect a household’s marginal tax rate, the price 
of giving is endogenous. As discussed above, we construct an instrument calculating the tax price 
of giving with donations set equal to zero. This will be correlated with the household’s actual price, 
but variation therein is driven by changes in the tax code, rather than any decision of the household. 
3.3  Limitations 
Like all of the literature on this empirically-challenging question, our work is subject to a 
number of limitations.  
As mentioned previously, the PSID has very few observations on high-income households, 
who make the majority of donations. Further, the data are arranged at the household level rather 
than by tax filing unit. This not only makes direct comparisons to previous work using tax returns 
difficult, but also introduces measurement error into the calculation of the tax price of giving 
(Butrica and Burkhauser, 1997). For example, a household in the PSID may include two tax filing 
 
estimation. Recent work by Almunia, Lockwood, and Scharf (2018) emphasizes the importance of estimating tax price 
effects on the extensive margin of giving. 
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units (such as a dependent who earns income); the household may be assigned a higher marginal 
tax rate based on its total income than the tax filing units have on their own.  
 The TCJA’s effects may also take some time to be felt fully. Short-run impacts may be 
larger or smaller than those in the longer run. Donors may have moved giving into 2017 to take 
advantage of higher tax prices, leading to overestimates of the law’s impact on aggregate giving. 
On the other hand, it may take some time for taxpayers to change their behavior in response to the 
new law, as the results detailed below suggest. Further, the TCJA incentivizes households to give 
less frequently but in larger amounts to reach the itemization threshold; the pattern of giving among 
donors around these cutoffs may change. The increasing popularity of donor-advised funds may 
play a role in this kind of timing behavior (Andreoni, 2018). The biennial structure of the PSID 
makes it more difficult to identify these shifts. 
 Finally, we are applying estimates from a time period with less radical changes in the tax 
code than the TCJA, at least in regard to the size of the standard deduction. It is unclear whether 
our results are fully applicable to the specific parameters of the law. Our findings are best viewed 
as an approximation rather than a firm prediction. 
 
4. Results 
4.1  Tax Price of Giving 
We begin by estimating the effect of the tax price of giving on the extensive and intensive 
margins separately. Table 2 shows these results, which also include the controls described in 
Section 3.2. Column 1 estimates the effect on the extensive margin, and indicates that a 10 percent 
increase in the tax price of giving reduces the likelihood of making any donation by 1.3 percentage 
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points, a statistically significant change and about a 3 percent change of the mean giving rate. 
Column 3 estimates the effect on the intensive margin of giving; a 10 percent increase in the tax 
price reduces the amount given conditional on giving by 3.4 percent. As discussed above, this 
estimate should not be interpreted as a reflection of the treatment of a higher tax price, since it also 
reflects a change in the composition of givers. Combining these effects to find the overall tax price  
elasticity of giving in Column 5, we find that a 10 percent increase in the tax price reduces giving 
by 10.7 percent. This elasticity is in line with the vast majority of previous work, and suggests that 
giving is responsive to its tax treatment.  
We also examine how charitable giving responds to increases in income in Table 2, noting 
that we also control for wealth and individual fixed effects; as such, these results should be 
interpreted as the impact of additional income for a particular household, holding all else equal. 
The marginal propensity to donate out of income is fairly low: our estimates suggest that, on 






Table 2: Effects of the Tax Price of Giving 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Extensive Margin Intensive Margin  
 Pr (Give > 0) 1st Stage Log Giving 1st Stage Combined 
      
Log Tax Price -0.130 ***  -0.338 ***  -1.071 *** 
 (0.0250)  (0.0746)  (0.1727) 
Net of Tax Income,  
in thousands 
4.19 x 10-07 *** -1.72 x 10-08 *** 2.45 x 10-06 *** -2.42 x 10-08 *** 2.07 x 10-06 *** 
(7.49 x 10-08) (4.70 x 10-09) (2.53 x 10-07) (6.96 x 10-09) (5.20 x 10-07) 
(Net of Tax Income,  
in thousands)2 
-3.50 x 10-13 *** 1.03 x 10-14 *** -1.58 x 10-12 *** 1.55 x 10-14 *** -3.13 x 10-12 *** 
(7.17 x 10-14) (2.65 x 10-15) (2.56 x 10-13) (4.10 x 10-15) (5.17 x 10-13) 
(Net of Tax Income,  
in thousands)3 
5.50 x 10-20 *** -1.44 x 10-2 1*** 2.48 x 10-19 *** -2.30 x 10-21 *** 4.91 x 10-19 *** 
(1.27 x 10-20) (4.32 x 10-22) (4.76 x 10-20) (6.88 x 10-22) (9.22 x 10-20) 
Log Zero-Dollar Tax 
Price 
 0.994 ***  0.991 ***  
 (0.000959)  (0.00135)  
      
Observations 45,583 45,583 25,285 25,285 45,474 
Number of 
Households 
9,660 9,660 6,778 6,778 9,644 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In addition to the variables listed, each specification also includes household fixed effects, bins for the level of wealth, 
marital status, household head’s age and its quadratic, number of children, whether the head is retired or disabled, the head’s health status, religious 
affiliation, as well as state and year effects and a housing price index and its quadratic. Standard errors are clustered at the household level and in 
parentheses. Column 1 reports the results of a linear probability model for the probability of making a gift, instrumenting for the log of the tax price using 
the log of the zero-dollar tax price. The first stage is shown in Column 2. Column 3 reports the results for the conditional log amount given, instrumenting 
for the log of the tax price using the log of the zero-dollar tax price. The first stage is shown in Column 4. Column 5 combines the estimates in Columns 1 





Table 3 reports the impact of the tax price of giving on donations including lead and lag 
terms. As discussed above, there is concern in the literature about anticipatory effects, as well as 
the possibility that taxpayers take time to fully adjust to a new tax regime. Column 1 includes a 
term for the lead of the log of tax price (instrumented with the lead of the log of the zero-dollar tax 
price). We find little evidence of anticipatory or timing effects; the coefficient is fairly small and 
imprecisely estimated. This is perhaps unsurprising, given that the PSID’s waves are two years 
apart. Few of the tax changes over the past two decades have had sufficient time between passage 
and enactment for households to adjust their giving behavior in such a manner (Ottoni-Wilhelm 
and Hungerman, 2007). Column 2 includes a lag for the log of the tax price (also instrumented). 
The lag term – again, for two years prior – is statistically significant and about two-thirds the size 
of the contemporaneous term. This suggests that even two years after a tax change, households are 
still responsive to the tax price they faced previously; that is, they adjust slowly. Column 3 includes 
both a lead and a lag term. The leading term remains small and statistically indistinguishable from 
zero, while the lagged term does not change much in magnitude or precision. Taken together, this 
suggests that the effects on charitable giving of changes to the tax code like the TCJA will grow 
over the first few years after implementation. 
Accounting for differences in behavior by switchers and always-itemizers is a matter of 
some contention (Backus and Grant, 2019). We follow Ottoni-Wilhelm and Hungerman (2007) 
and divide the sample into households who always itemize and households that switch itemizing 
status over the sample period in Table 4. As discussed in Section 3.3, it is difficult to know how 
applicable these results are to changes wrought by the TCJA. In our sample, less than 10 percent 
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of households change itemizing status in each year; 21 percent of households ever change 
itemizing status and 5.1 percent always itemize. 
 
 
Table 3: Anticipatory and Lagged Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Lead Lag Lead and Lag 
    
Log Tax Price 
-0.9944*** -0.8165*** -0.8042*** 
(0.1846) (0.1859) (0.2097) 
Log Tax Price (year + 2) 
-0.0552  0.176 
(0.1855)  (0.2049) 
Log Tax Price (year – 2) 
 -0.5568*** -0.5625 *** 
 (0.1817) (0.1994) 
Net of Tax Income,  
in thousands 
3.27 x 10-06 *** -3.84 x 10-06 *** 2.84 x 10-06 *** 
(5.46 x 10-07) (5.46 x 10-07)  (6.10 x 10-07) 
(Net of Tax Income,  
in thousands)2  
-2.60 x 10-12 *** -2.66 x 10-12 *** -1.95 x 10-12 *** 
(5.09 x 10-13) (4.66 x 10-13) (4.54 x 10-13) 
(Net of Tax Income,  
in thousands)3 
4.09 x 10-19 *** 3.99 x 10-19 *** 2.88 x 10-19 *** 
(8.97 x 10-20) (7.98 x 10-20) (7.48 x 10-20) 
    
Observations 34,712 34,776 26,636 
Number of Households 7,774 7,792 6,333 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Each column reports the marginal effects on the unconditional log amount given, 
calculated by estimating the extensive and intensive margins separately. Lead and lag values are instrumented using 
the lead and lag values of the log of the zero-dollar tax price. Each specification also includes household fixed 
effects, bins for the level of wealth, marital status, household head’s age and its quadratic, number of children, 
whether the head is retired or disabled, the head’s health status, religious affiliation, as well as state and year effects 










Table 4: Effects by Itemization Status 
 (1) (2) 
 Always-Itemizers Sometimes-Itemizers 
   
Log Tax Price 
-0.7879 -1.242 *** 
(0.665) (0.1911) 
Net of Tax Income, in thousands 
1.25 x 10-06 4.82 x 10-06 *** 
(8.82 x 10-07) (8.62 x 10-07) 
(Net of Tax Income, in thousands)2  
-1.34 x 10-12 ** -4.10 x 10-12 *** 
(6.16 x 10-13) (1.03 x 10-12) 
(Net of Tax Income, in thousands)3 
2.56 x 10-19 ** 6.53 x 10-19 *** 
(1.10 x 10-19) (1.82 x 10-19) 
   
Observations 3,891 16,076 
Number of Households 696 2,614 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Each column reports the marginal effects on the unconditional log amount given, 
calculated by estimating the extensive and intensive margins separately. The sample in Column 1 is limited to 
households that itemize in each year, as calculated by TAXSIM. The sample in Column 2 is limited to households that 
itemize at least once during the sample period, but not in every year, as calculated by TAXSIM. Each specification 
also includes household fixed effects, bins for the level of wealth, marital status, household head’s age and its quadratic, 
number of children, whether the head is retired or disabled, the head’s health status, religious affiliation, as well as 




But the TCJA is projected to significantly reduce the prevalence of itemizing, especially 
for the income groups with representation in the PSID. Among units earning between $100,000 
and $200,000, the Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that itemizing will fall from 63 percent 
to 22 percent. Put another way, the composition of switchers and always-itemizers will change. 
Itemizing is less likely to change for very high income households; average itemized deductions 
for units earning over $1 million were $465,000 in 2016, far above the new level of the standard 
deduction (IRS, 2018).35  
 
35 The elimination of the Pease phase-out for itemized giving also increases the overall value of itemized deductions 
for households with incomes at the top of the distribution, though this does not affect the tax price of giving. 
 69 
We find that always-itemizers are much less sensitive to the tax price of giving. The 
estimated tax price elasticity is -0.79 and is not statistically significantly different than zero, as the 
estimate is quite noisy. The elasticity for switchers, though, is -1.24 and statistically significant. 
There are a number of possible reasons for this difference. Switchers may be more aware of the 
impact of itemizing – and therefore the tax price – on their giving. They may be more strategic in 
the timing of their giving. Further, the changes in their tax prices from year to year are much larger 
than for always-itemizers.36 As such, the data cover a broader range of price changes and may 
reflect a different relationship than that for the always-itemizers. 
4.2  Projections for the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 
 The TCJA changed both the price of giving (by altering the standard deduction and 
marginal tax rates) and the amount of money available to donate by changing tax liabilities. To 
estimate the net predicted changes under the TCJA, we separately estimate the price and income 
effects on giving for 10 bins of income from the PSID. Projections for higher-income households 
are discussed in Section 4.3.  
 We use the 2016 PSID data from the 2017 wave to project tax prices and post-tax income 
for 2018 by using TAXSIM under TCJA policies rather than those in place in 2016.37 We follow 
TAXSIM’s predictions of who would itemize in 2016 and 2018 based on relevant deductions; 
itemizing behavior changes dramatically for households in the PSID sample. For example, Table 
5A shows that 46.1 percent of households with AGI between $100,000 and $125,000 are should 
itemize in 2016, but only 13.4 percent of those same households would itemize under the TCJA. 
 
36 For example, the TCJA’s change in the top tax bracket increases the tax price of giving by 4.3 percent (a marginal 
tax rate reduction from 39.6 percent to 37 percent), but an individual in that bracket who stops itemizing because of 
the increase in the standard deduction sees a price increase of 65 percent.  
37 TAXSIM’s calculations also include any state tax changes that took place for the 2018 filing year.  
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Reductions in itemizing are even more dramatic for slightly higher income bins, with the 
prevalence of itemizing dropping from 81 percent to 26 percent among those earning between 
$125,000 and $200,000. The mean tax price of giving increases from 0.947 to 0.980 for all 
observations in 2016 when applying the TCJA’s provisions; among itemizers in 2016, the tax price 
is projected to increase from 0.751 to 0.905.  
 As discussed above, we estimate separate price elasticities for always-itemizers and 
switchers, which we apply to the estimates here. We calculate the number of continuing non-
itemizers, continuing itemizers, and switchers from 2016 to 2018 and apply a weighted average of 
the number, mean giving, and mean price change for each type to the appropriate elasticities to 
generate the average price change for each bin (Table 5B).  
 Tables 5A and 5B apply these estimates to the changes from the TCJA for selected income 
bins. In Panel A, Column 1 reports the number of observations per bin (in the 2017 wave of the 
PSID, corresponding to 2016). Columns 2 and 3 report the mean tax price of giving and the percent 
of households itemizing, as calculated by TAXSIM, for that year. Columns 4 and 5 are the 
estimated tax prices and percent of households itemizing based on the provisions of the TCJA, as 
applied to the PSID data from 2016. Note that the prevalence of itemizing falls dramatically and, 
as expected, the tax price of giving increases.  
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Table 5A: Estimated Effects of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 
  
2016 PSID Data 
TCJA Counterfactual Applied to 2016 
PSID Data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Federal AGI N Mean Tax Price Percent Itemizing  Mean Tax Price  Percent Itemizing  
$0 - $20,000 1,663 0.99 0.48% 0.99 0.12% 
$20,000 - $30,000 417 0.99 3.84% 0.99 1.20% 
$30,000 - $40,000 459 0.99 7.19% 0.99 2.61% 
$40,000 - $50,000 418 0.98 11.24% 0.99 3.11% 
$50,000 - $75,000 765 0.96 16.08% 0.99 5.49% 
$75,000 - $100,000 514 0.94 25.49% 0.97 9.73% 
$100,000 - $125,000 596 0.87 46.14% 0.96 13.42% 
$125,000 - $200,000 241 0.77 80.91% 0.92 26.14% 
$200,000 - $300,000 178 0.70 91.01% 0.90 33.15% 
$300,000 - $500,000 55 0.67 87.27% 0.84 49.09% 
This table reports projections of the impact of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act on itemizing status and tax price using the TAXSIM program. Column (1) reports 




Table 5B: Projected Effects of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Federal AGI 
Mean ∆ in Tax 
Price 
Mean ∆ in Giving 
Due to Tax Price 
Mean ∆ in Post-
Tax Income 
Mean ∆ in  
Income-Induced  
Giving 
Mean Net ∆ in 
Giving 
(2) + (4) 
$0 - $20,000 
0.0002 -$0.18 $9 $0.02 -$0.16 
$20,000 - $30,000 0.0037 -$1.74 $196 $0.27 -$1.47 
$30,000 - $40,000 0.0060 -$6 $375 $0.68 -$5 
$40,000 - $50,000 0.0125 -$10 $568 $1 -$9 
$50,000 - $75,000 0.0224 -$34 $838 $2 -$32 
$75,000 - $100,000 0.0336 -$34 $1,338 $5 -$29 
$100,000 - $125,000 0.0834 -$154 $1,503 $7 -$146 
$125,000 - $200,000 0.1506 -$378 $1,807 $13 -$365 
$200,000 - $300,000 0.2009 -$615 $2,759 $26 -$589 
$300,000 - $500,000 0.1706 -$848 $9,841 $130 -$718 
This table reports projections of the impact of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, estimating mean changes in the tax price of giving and tax liability using the 





Table 5B displays the mean change in the tax price of giving in Column 1, and applies our 
elasticity result to calculate the estimated change in giving induced by the change in the tax price 
in Column 2.38 As expected, the changes for lower-income bins are small, since few households 
itemize in that range. Column 3 shows the average change in income expected from the TCJA, and 
Column 4 applies the marginal propensity to donate out of income (calculated from Table 4) to 
those figures. Column 5 combines the estimates. As described above, these income-induced 
increases in giving are fairly small. For example, for households with AGI between $75,000 and 
$100,000, the income-induced increase is about 15 percent of the change due to the tax price, and 
only about 4 percent for households between $100,000 and $300,000. For the highest-income bin 
in the PSID, though, the income-induced increase in giving offsets about 15 percent of the decrease.  
Figure 1 plots the projected changes in itemizing status by income group, while Figure 2 
does so for the tax price. Figure 3 shows the projected changes induced by the tax price changes 
in the TCJA as well as the amount net of income-induced increases in giving. Figure 4 shows 















38 We winsorize giving at the 95th percentile for this calculation; a small number of outliers increases mean giving by 
an unrealistic and unrepresentative amount.  
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Figure 1: Changes in Proportion of Households Itemizing in 2016 and Counterfactual 




This figure displays the changes in each bin of net-of-tax income in the 2017 wave of the PSID (corresponding to 
2016) between the proportion of households itemizing in 2016 and that projected under the TCJA. These results 














Figure 2: Changes in Mean Tax Price in 2016 and Counterfactual Predicted Under Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Act 
 
 
This figure displays the changes in each bin of net-of-tax income in the 2017 wave of the PSID (corresponding to 
2016) between the mean tax price of giving for households in 2016 and that projected under the TCJA. These results 

















Figure 3: Changes Between 2016 Giving and Counterfactual Predicted Under Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act 
 
This figure displays the changes in each bin of net-of-tax income in the 2017 wave of the PSID (corresponding to 
2016) between actual giving and that projected under the TCJA. The blue bars reflect the projected change solely 
based on the tax price, corresponding to Column (2) of Table 5B. The red bars includes the change induced by the 















Figure 4: Differences Between 2016 Giving and Counterfactual Predicted Under Tax Cuts 
and Jobs Act 
 
This figure displays mean donations in each bin of net-of-tax income in the 2017 wave of the PSID (corresponding to 
2016). It also displays the estimated mean giving for that bin based on the TCJA’s impact on the tax price of charitable 
giving and the increase in net-of-tax income. The difference between these two bars corresponds to the results in 




4.3  Projections for High-Income Tax Filing Units 
 Unsurprisingly, high-income donors make a large share of total donations. Even a small 
percentage of a ten-million-dollar income is significantly more than the combined donations of 
tens of thousands of lower-income households. As such, the behavior of these households in the 
face of changes to the tax code is of significant interest. Unfortunately, as detailed above, the PSID 
simply does not sample a sufficient number of these high earners. Nevertheless, we estimate some 
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simple projections to provide insight on expected changes in giving and the degree to which 
additional disposable income from the TCJA might offset these changes. 
 We use the Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income (2018) to create representative 
tax filing units using the means of the various components of income and itemized deductions for 
the 2016 tax year. We group them together into bins above $500,000 ($500K-$1M; $1M-$5M; 
$5M-$10M; $10M+). We assume that households earning above $1 million continue to itemize at 
the same rate as they did prior to the TCJA, as the means of itemizing exceeds the new standard 
deduction by a significant amount. Of course, there will be some marginal tax filing units that 
switch to the standard deduction. That would tend to increase our estimate of the reduction in 
giving, though we expect the number of switchers to be small, even with the cap on state and local 
tax deductions. For the $500,000-$1M group, we apply estimates from the Tax Policy Center (2018) 
for the expected number of units that stop itemizing. 
 We then estimate the tax price of giving as described above, using TAXSIM, as well as 
calculating the expected change in tax liability. Our estimates for the latter are similar to those by 
the Joint Committee on Taxation (2019) and Gale et al. (2018).  
 We can apply our estimates of the tax price elasticity of giving to these calculations, though 
we must make the assumption that our estimated elasticity are valid for these higher-income bins. 
Our estimates for the marginal propensity to donate out of income yield implausible predictions 
that are orders of magnitude larger than a reasonable amount; it is clearly not reasonable to apply 
estimates from households earning less than $300,000 to households at the upper reaches of the 
income distribution. We therefore show estimates for a range of plausible values for the marginal 
propensity to donate in Table 6. 
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Table 6: Projected Effects of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act for High Earners 
    Mean Net ∆ in Giving 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Federal AGI 
Mean ∆ in 
Tax Price 
Mean ∆ in 
Giving Due to 
Tax Price 













$500K - $1M -0.029 $234 $14,091 $374 $515 $656 $797 $938 
$1M - $5M 0.024 -$2,054 $19,965 -$1,854 -$1,655 -$1,455 -$1,255 -$1,056 
$5M - $10M 0.024 -$10,036 $44,779 -$9,588 -$9,140 -$8,692 -$8,245 -$7,797 
$10M+ 0.029 -$104,838 $140,663 -$103,431 -$102,025 -$100,618 -$99,211 -$97,805 
This table reports projected effects of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act for higher-income bins. Changes in tax price and post-tax income are calculating using 
TAXSIM on representative tax filing units from the IRS Statistics of Income. Columns (4)-(8) report the overall net change in giving under different 




Even with our assumption that they continue itemizing, households earning above $1 
million see substantial reductions in charitable giving due to changes in tax price. However, 
particularly for the highest levels of the income distribution, the reduction in tax liability is 
sufficiently large that reasonable values for the marginal propensity of giving offset a meaningful 
portion of the tax-price-induced reduction. For example, a marginal propensity to donate of 0.02 
for households with AGI between $1 and $5 million offsets about 20 percent of the reduction.  
 Finally, we scale our estimates in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 up by the number of tax filing units 
in each income bin. We estimate that, had they been in effect in 2016, the provisions of the Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Act would have reduced charitable giving by about $9.8 billion, or about 3.5 percent 
of total individual giving.  
While lacking many of the important determinants of charitable giving, including wealth, 
new research on the marginal propensity to donate and tax price elasticity of giving of very high-
income households using administrative tax data would be valuable. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper provides updated estimates of the tax price elasticity of charitable giving using 
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. We apply these results to the provisions of the Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act of 2017 and predict significant reductions in charitable giving, primarily arising from the 
reduction in the number of households that itemize their deductions.  
We note a number of limitations to this study, particularly in regards to the relative dearth 
of very high income households in the data. Additionally, the TCJA’s changes to the standard 
deduction are outside the scope of changes to the tax code covered in our data. It is difficult to 
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know how accurate our extrapolations are, particularly for very high income households. But we 
do show that plausible values for the marginal propensity to donate out of income offset some 
portion of the tax-price-induced reduction in giving. Projections that do not account for this 
countervailing effect are likely to overestimate the impact of reductions in marginal tax rates on 
giving. 
We also find evidence that taxpayers take at least several years to fully respond to changes 
in the tax price of giving. To the extent that charitable giving is habit-forming (Rosen and Sims, 
2011; Meer, 2013), and that changes to incentives to give through one form of philanthropy alter 
giving to others (Gee and Meer, 2019; Scharf, Smith, and Wilhelm, 2017; Brown, Meer, and 
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In an LGBTQ town hall during his 2020 Presidential campaign, Beto O’Rourke said he 
would revoke the tax-exempt status of churches that oppose same-sex marriage (Cook, 2019). 
There was considerable backlash from conservatives and Christians but also from economists and 
popular media writers who noted there would be several negative consequences of such a decision 
(Strain, 2019; Inazu, 2019). Some dismissed Beto’s idea out-of-hand as politically implausible and 
therefore moot.  
This is not a fringe issue or idea, however. The tax-exempt status of religious groups that 
oppose same-sex marriage came up in oral arguments during Obergefell v. Hodges (Bailey, 2015; 
Oppenheimer, 2015).39 Religious organizations have historically been the strongest dissenting 
voice against expanding rights for LGBT people. As support for equal protection under the law for 
same-sex couples rises (Pew Research Center, 2019) the intersection between religious freedom 
and civil rights will likely become an even more pressing issue. 
Emerging civil rights jurisprudence is not the only motivation for revoking the tax-exempt 
status of religious organizations. Some writers in popular media outlets claim the tax-exemption 
for churches is inefficient (Yglesias, 2013), dramatically decreases tax revenue (Matthews, 2013), 
and does not fulfill the original intent of the law (Fleischer, 2015). The “scholarly” work behind 
 
39 Obergefell v. Hodges 576 U.S. 644 (2015) was a landmark Supreme Court case that ruled that the right to marry 
was extended to same-sex couples, effectively legalizing same-sex marriage. 
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these opinions is highly suspect and there is by no means consensus (Strain, 2019; Elliot, 2017), 
but clearly some believe there should be a discussion about tax exemption for religious groups.  
Estimating the impacts of such a tax policy would be informative to this discussion. To my 
knowledge, there has not yet been a serious attempt to this end. There are many reasons for this. 
For some, it is a policy proposal so far removed from being a real possibility that it does not warrant 
rigorous attention. For those interested, it is a complex and elusive question as I show below. 
Reliable data on charitable giving to religious groups is rare. Religious organizations such as 
churches and mosques are not required to file returns with the IRS like other tax-exempt nonprofits 
(Internal Revenue Service Publication 1828) so there is little systematic information on their 
finances. State and local tax treatment of nonprofits varies widely. 
In this short essay, I attempt to empirically estimate the effects of removing the tax-exempt 
status of religious groups. For brevity, I use the term “church” to broadly encompass any religious 
organization that might benefit from tax-exemption whose primary purpose is conducting religious 
services (e.g. mosques, synagogues, temples). I make three key assumptions to simplify analysis 
in this hypothetical policy world: only churches lose federal tax exempt status (not auxiliaries or 
religiously-affiliated charities), all churches lose exemption (not just those out of compliance with 
civil rights law), and state and local governments follow the lead of federal law. I discuss these in 
greater detail in section 3. This last assumption is especially important because state and local 
governments have a great deal of discretion in the incorporation and tax treatment of charities, and 
allowing for heterogeneous responses to federal policy would dramatically complicate analysis. 
The purpose of this essay is not to discuss the moral or constitutional arguments against or 
in favor a policy that removes the tax-exempt status of churches. That is best left to legislators and 
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tax and constitutional lawyers. Instead, I provide an analysis and discussion of several 
consequences such a policy might have. 
 
2. Context 
It is helpful to discuss the existing tax benefits churches receive to provide a framework 
for analyzing the policy change. Since the War Revenue Act of 1917, donations to charitable 
organizations, including churches, have been deductible from taxable income. This is not without 
consequence for the government’s tax revenue (Gravelle et al., 2019), but has been justified by the 
assertion that charities provide social services for the benefit of the public that encourage social 
cohesion and reduce government spending on related services. Economists followed the birth and 
expansion of the charitable deduction with decades of research into the “tax price of charitable 
giving” to assess whether charitable deductions are “treasury efficient” (a dollar of tax revenue 
forfeited generates a dollar or more of private contributions to a public good). See Bakija (2013) 
for a primer on this literature. 
Charitable organizations have a favorable tax treatment beyond their donors being 
incentivized to give by the tax code. Under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), tax-exempt charities 
are not required to pay taxes on their income or profits, though they are required to pay social 
security and FICA taxes (Internal Revenue Service Publication 1828). All 50 states have laws 
exempting qualified nonprofits from paying property taxes and most also allow exemption from 
sales taxes (Kenyon and Langely, 2011). 
Churches receive additional tax benefits not afforded to other charities. The “parsonage 
rule” allows ministers to “exclude from gross income the fair rental value of a home provided as 
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part of compensation (a parsonage) or a housing allowance provided as compensation if it is used 
to rent or otherwise provide a home.” This reduces the amount of employment taxes paid by 
churches and could potentially allow them to pay ministers less money. Additionally, by IRS 
policy, churches are not required to apply for or register to receive tax exemption and they are 
exempted from filing Form 990 that is required of other tax-exempt entities. Lastly, the IRS has 
special (strict) rules limiting their authority to audit churches. (Internal Revenue Service 
Publication 1828) 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Assumptions 
I evaluate a hypothetical policy world where churches are no longer tax-exempt entities. 
As mentioned before, this requires simplifying assumptions to make analysis tractable. I first make 
three key assumptions about the hypothetical policy world that provide the foundation for analysis. 
Assumption 1: Only religious organizations (churches) lose their tax-exempt status. 
This does not include religious schools, hospitals, or other organizations who have 
a primary purpose other than providing or conducting religious services. 
 
Assumption 2: All churches lose tax-exempt status, independent of religion, creed, 
or practice. 
 
Assumption 3: All states and municipalities uniformly follow the federal tax 
treatment of churches.  
To be sure these are strong assumptions. For example, in Bob Jones University v. United 
States, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment does not protect institutions from 
having their tax exemption revoked by the IRS if the institution has practices in opposition to a 
“fundamental national public policy.” This set a precedent for an arguably more plausible first step: 
evaluating the tax-exemption of religious universities that violate civil rights law. This would of 
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course violate both Assumptions 1 and 2. As for Assumption 3, the existing heterogeneity in the 
state and local tax treatment of nonprofits suggests that states and municipalities would not respond 
uniformly to a federal policy that removes churches’ tax exemption. Areas with a high 
concentration of religious voters would likely seek to protect the favorable tax status of churches 
while other states might opt to follow the federal government’s lead. Taken together, it is clear 
how removing these assumptions would quickly complicate analysis.40  
3.2 Approach and data 
I will look at two dimensions that this hypothetical policy might impact: donative behavior 
(giving) and church revenues and expenses in the United States. In reality these are not isolated 
realms of behavior and, under this policy, we would expect there to be iterative interaction in the 
long-run. For example, if donations go down then churches will be incentivized to be more 
strategic about “making the ask” which could mitigate the reduction in donation income. I focus 
here on what I can tractably analyze but I acknowledge that such dynamics are important to 
consider for a holistic understanding of the implications of a policy. 
 As in Chapter III, I use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to analyze donor behavior. 
The PSID is especially advantageous here because it separately records secular and religious 
giving and includes questions on the religious affiliation of respondents. Religious giving in the 
PSID is explicitly elicited only for religious institutions – what I call churches here – and not 
religiously-affiliated charities like hospitals, food pantries, etc. 41  This is crucial in satisfying 
 
40 For example, if some states maintain tax exemptions for churches, will those states lose eligibility for federal grants? 
How will federal income taxes account for households who were able to deduct church donations on their state tax 
return? Will states continue to allow municipalities discretion on how sales and property taxes are levied on churches? 
Clearly some questions are impossible to answer in advance of a serious legal discussion.  
41 The PSID elicits religious giving with the following: “Did you make any donations specifically for religious 
purposes or spiritual development, for example to a church, synagogue, mosque, TV or radio ministry? Please do not 
include donations to schools, hospitals, and other charities run by religious organizations. I will ask about those next.” 
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Assumption 1. For robustness, I include a range of estimates for donative behavior using the “PSID 
definition” of religious giving and an “expanded definition” of religious giving. For the expanded 
definition I include a household’s reported giving to the “other” category as religious instead of 
secular. This leaves nine categories of secular giving: youth, art, education, health, international 
aid, environment, neighborhood/community, basic needs, and combined purpose organizations. 
The PSID definition only includes reported religious donations as religious; all other giving is 
considered secular.  
Further, as mentioned in Chapter III, the PSID includes giving for both itemizers and non-
itemizers which allows me to observe households that never itemize or stop itemizing. It is 
necessary to include such households to get accurate estimates of how behavior would change 
across income levels; limiting analysis to itemizers would drastically overstate changes in giving, 
especially among lower-income groups with very few itemizers. 
 For simplicity, I restrict analysis to data from the 2017 PSID year (2016 tax year). To 
approximate policy responses under the most up-to-date tax code, I estimate all tax liabilities as 
though this policy occurs in 2018 (inflation-adjusting monetary variables). This means the 
hypothetical policy I analyze is occurring under the tax schedule and deduction rules for the Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017.42 Federal and state marginal tax rates and tax liabilities come from 
NBER’s TAXSIM. I remove one household that has a state marginal tax rate over 50%, which is 
implausible and is likely the consequence of a weird notch in the tax code that TAXSIM has 
difficulty estimating. Similar to Chapter III, I group households by estimated federal adjusted gross 
income (AGI). Two households with negative AGI and 34 households with AGI over $500,000 
 
42 As shown in Chapter III, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act dramatically reduced the incentive, and therefore propensity, 
to itemize. This further highlights the importance of having data on non-itemizers to conduct this policy analysis. 
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are removed. I limit analysis to households making no more than $500,000 per year in adjusted 
gross income because there are not enough observations in the PSID above this level to generate 
reliable estimates. This leaves me with a final sample of 6,022 households. Table 1 summarizes 
the AGI bins.  
 As discussed in Chapter III, the TCJA dramatically reduced the incentive, and therefore 
propensity, to itemize for most households. This further highlights the importance of having giving 
data for non-itemizers to conduct this policy analysis. However, this also implies that the benefits 
of itemizing donations increasingly accrue to higher-income households. Our data does not 
sufficiently cover households with AGI over $500,000 to draw reliable conclusions, but those are 
the households most likely to itemize. It is also insufficient to use IRS tax return data (or their 
summaries, as used in Chapter III): these data do not separately document donations to churches 
and secular organizations which precludes the exact analysis needed to evaluate this policy. We 
are left with an ironic data gap. The tax liabilities of donors for which we have solid data are 
predominately unaffected by changes in churches’ tax-exemption, and the necessary data is 
missing for the majority of donors whose tax liabilities would be impacted by such a policy. 
Despite this, I analyze how giving behavior will change for households in our data making under 
$500,000 per year, while acknowledging that this is an incomplete picture and that future research 
would greatly benefit from more detailed data on high-income households. 
I also combine results from the PSID with the National Congregations Study (NCS) from 
2012 to try to estimate consequences for churches. The NCS is a nationally representative sample 
of American congregations, collected in conjunction with the General Social Survey.43 Face-to-
 
43 The 2012 NCS includes an oversample of Hispanic congregations. 
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face surveys elicit various aspects of respondents’ congregations. Respondents are predominantly 
clergy or staff members – 7% were non-staff congregational leaders. The NCS includes 
information on the tradition and denominational affiliation of congregations, as well as estimates 
of the number of regular adult and non-adult participants. 
 
 
Table 1: Summary of Federal Adjusted Gross Income Bins 
Federal AGI N Minimum AGI Maximum AGI Mean AGI 
$0 - $20,000 1,762 $0 $19,961 $5,090 
$20,000 - $30,000 427 $20,003 $29,988 $24,995 
$30,000 - $40,000 469 $30,055 $39,986 $34,966 
$40,000 - $50,000 407 $40,005 $49,875 $44,614 
$50,000 - $75,000 880 $50,190 $74,970 $61,252 
$75,000 - $100,000 617 $75,222 $99,961 $86,892 
$100,000 - $125,000 777 $100,275 $149,678 $122,610 
$125,000 - $200,000 337 $150,150 $199,815 $172,716 
$200,000 - $300,000 232 $200,502 $297,599 $238,566 
$300,000 - $500,000 80 $300,300 $493,521 $371,938 
 
 
Both the PSID and NCS have categories for belief (religion, tradition, denomination, etc.) 
I condense PSID households into 12 (self-identified) belief categories: Atheist/Agnostic, Baptist, 
Catholic/Orthodox, Episcopalian, Jewish, Latter-day Saints (Mormon), Lutheran, Methodist, 
Other Non-Christian, Other Protestant, Pentecostal, and Presbyterian. The majority of these were 
naturally occurring categories in PSID data – “Other Non-Christian” and “Other Protestant” were 
necessary catch-all categories to avoid extremely small groups and make analysis meaningful.44 
Unsurprisingly, the set of NCS categories is much larger than the PSID. I consolidate NCS labels 
 
44 For example, in 2017 the PSID has only 4 households that report being Amish or Mennonite and 1 being Quaker.  
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of tradition and denomination to fit the same 12 belief categories as in the PSID. This allows me 
to merge the data sets and analyze financial effects for different types of churches in section 5.45  
Data on churches is another, arguably larger, hurdle to overcome in assessing this policy. 
As mentioned above, the IRS does not require churches to file returns (such as Form 990) like 
other nonprofits that are exempt from taxes.46 So data on churches’ finances – staff compensation, 
donation receipts, assets, and property – are only available in surveys that ask, which are 
necessarily subject to inaccurate reporting or intentional mis-reporting. Further, because churches 
in the United States are disaggregated (not coordinated or governed by a singular entity), data may 
be differentially available and reliable. For example, a survey of Baptist churches is clearly not 
representative of Catholic churches or Islamic masjids, and surveys containing detailed 
information on a broad spectrum of religious institutions are sparse. 
 
4. Donative Behavior 
It is most clear to start by analyzing how donors would respond when donations to churches 
are no longer itemizable deductions. This data is most straightforward and there is a wealth of 
literature on tax price elasticities (see Chapter III for more discussion on this topic).  
There is very little work that separately estimates the tax price elasticity of religious giving 
and secular giving, though there is reasonable conjecture that religious people’s giving to their 
churches is relatively inelastic (Eckel and Grossman, 2004; Brooks, 2007; Helms and Thornton, 
2012; Thornton and Helms, 2013). Brooks (2007) and Helms and Thornton (2012) both use PSID 
 
45 Of course, it is problematic to connect reports of congregation sizes from 2012 to giving data from 2017. This is a 
necessary connection in the absence of more recent, available congregation data. 
46 Churches are required to file returns for unrelated business income (Internal Revenue Service Publication 1828). 
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data to estimate separate tax prices elasticities and show that religious giving should be considered 
differently from other types of giving.47 I use the approach outlined in Chapter III to generate 
separate elasticities for religious and secular giving using PSID data from 2001 to 2017, similar to 
Helms and Thornton (2012). I find that religious giving is inelastic (between -0.529 and -0.544) 
and secular giving is essentially unit elastic, meaning if the tax price of giving increases 10% then 
giving to churches will decrease by 5.3 – 5.4% and all other giving will decrease by 10%.48 
However, even facing fairly inelastic responses to changes in the price of giving to a church, we 
may reasonably expect that removing the favorable tax treatment of religious contributions will 
decrease religious giving for some households.  
The question is then how much will giving be reduced. There are two parts to this: a 
reduction in religious giving due to the change in tax treatment and, potentially, a reduction in 
secular giving due to a change in itemization status or marginal tax rate. When religious giving is 
no longer itemizable, the tax price of secular giving may also increase for a household, either by 
shifting them into a new tax bracket or by removing the incentive to itemize altogether.  
To calculate this change, I first estimate two tax prices: one when all giving is deductible 
for itemizers and the other when only secular giving is deductible (i.e. the hypothetical policy). I 
calculate these prices using the same method as described in Chapter III, by observing changes in 
the estimated tax liability when $100 is added to giving. I estimate that 8% of households itemize 
when all giving can be included. When only secular giving is itemizable, just 6% of households 
 
47 The estimation techniques used by Brooks (2007) and Helms and Thornton (2012) are fairly similar: both use the 
zero-dollar price instrument that is standard in the literature. They accomplish this by regressing religious and secular 
giving, separately, on the log of the price and control variables. Brooks (2007) breaks down secular giving into several 
giving categories as well.  
48 Helms and Thornton (2012) find tax price elasticities of religious and secular giving equal to -0.79 and -1.217, 
respectively. They use the 2001 - 2005 PSID giving data and a different technique to account for nongivers. Our 
estimates are qualitatively similar. 
 97 
itemize, meaning 25% of itemizing households only do so because of their religious giving. The 
changing propensity to itemize is not uniform across the income distribution – higher-income 
households are both more likely to already itemize and more likely to stop itemizing due to the 
policy. Figure 1 shows how itemizing behavior changes across AGI groups. 
 
 
Figure 1: Changes in Proportion of Households Itemizing from  
Removing Tax Exemption for Religious Donations 
 
 
To estimate changes in giving to religious and secular recipients, we first break apart how 
the price of giving changes for each category. As in Chapter III, and following the literature, the 
tax price of giving for itemizers is 1 − 𝜏 and 1 for non-itemizers, where 𝜏 is the marginal tax rate 
faced by a household. This reflects that when a dollar is donated, it reduces taxable income on that 
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dollar by the marginal tax rate 𝜏, so the donation really only costs the donor 1 − 𝜏. I define the 
price of religious giving under current standard tax rules (“the standard”), 𝑃𝑅, and under the new 
policy (“the policy”), 𝑃𝑅
′ , as: 
𝑃𝑅 = {
1                    𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑖𝑛𝑔
1 − 𝜏            𝑖𝑓 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑖𝑛𝑔        
 
𝑃𝑅
′ = 1                     𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑜𝑛𝑒       
and define the standard and policy prices for secular giving as: 
𝑃𝑆 = {
1                    𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑖𝑛𝑔




1                    𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑖𝑛𝑔
1 − 𝜏′            𝑖𝑓 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑖𝑛𝑔        
 
where 𝜏′ is the marginal tax rate under the policy. 𝜏′ and 𝜏 could be different if the change in 
itemized deductions increases taxable income enough to shift the household into a different tax 
bracket. This implies that the change in religious and secular prices, respectively, from the standard 
to the policy can be expressed as: 
∆𝑃𝑅 = {
0                      𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑      
𝜏                      𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝜏                      𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑖𝑛𝑔        
 
∆𝑃𝑆 = {
0                      𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑      
𝜏                      𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝜏 − 𝜏′             𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑙 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑖𝑛𝑔        
 
The main distinction between ∆𝑃𝑅 and ∆𝑃𝑆 is for households that continue to itemize under the 
policy: the religious price goes up by the standard marginal tax rate but the secular price is the 
difference between the standard and policy marginal tax rates. While this difference could 
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theoretically be non-zero, in reality the vast majority of continuing itemizers do not experience 
meaningful changes in their marginal tax rate.49 
 
 
Table  2: Changes in the Tax Price of Religious and Secular Giving 
Federal AGI 










$0 - $20,000 0.00014 0.02% 0.00006 0.01% 
$20,000 - $30,000 0.00059 0.06% 0.00019 0.05% 
$30,000 - $40,000 0.0025 0.29% 0.00095 0.11% 
$40,000 - $50,000 0.0053 0.63% 0.00029 0.03% 
$50,000 - $75,000 0.011 1.44% 0.0022 0.28% 
$75,000 - $100,000 0.019 2.56% 0.0038 0.49% 
$100,000 - $125,000 0.038 5.27% 0.011 1.42% 
$125,000 - $200,000 0.068 9.40% 0.017 2.36% 
$200,000 - $300,000 0.096 13.57% 0.027 3.79% 




 Table 2 shows the average percent change in tax price for religious and secular giving by 
AGI group using the normal PSID definition of donations to religious and secular causes. Across 
all income levels, the price of religious and secular giving increases by 5.87% and 1.35%, 
respectively, on average. Naturally, the changes in prices are concentrated in higher income bins 
because those groups have a higher proportion of itemizers. Also, as expected, for every bin the 
mean percent change in the religious price is higher than the mean percent change in the secular 
price. This is the direct implication of religious giving no longer being itemizable. 
I combine the estimated changes in prices, elasticities, and mean giving by income bin to 
generate estimates of the change giving shown in Panel A of Table 3. These estimates use the PSID 
 
49 Only 12 observations have meaningfully different calculated marginal tax rates under the standard and the policy. 
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definitions of giving. Because there are so few itemizers, not many households face a change in 
prices and giving doesn’t noticeably change until the top two income groups. For example, a 
household with $200,000 in adjusted gross income is predicted to give about $150 ($200) less to 
churches (all causes), on average, under the policy. Figure 2 shows this change graphically 
alongside estimates using the elasticities calculated in Helms and Thornton (2012) for comparison. 
 
 
Table 3: Estimated Changes in Giving from  
Removing Tax Exemption for Religious Donations 
Panel A 
Federal AGI 
Mean Change in 
Religious Giving 
Mean Change in 
Secular Giving 
Mean Change in 
Total Giving 
$0 - $20,000 -$0.04 -$0.01 -$0.05 
$20,000 - $30,000 -$0.11 -$0.08 -$0.20 
$30,000 - $40,000 -$0.53 -$0.20 -$0.72 
$40,000 - $50,000 -$1.55 -$0.07 -$1.62 
$50,000 - $75,000 -$5.40 -$0.92 -$6.31 
$75,000 - $100,000 -$12.95 -$1.88 -$14.84 
$100,000 - $125,000 -$39.09 -$8.47 -$47.56 
$125,000 - $200,000 -$81.12 -$22.27 -$103.39 
$200,000 - $300,000 -$149.57 -$47.18 -$196.75 
$300,000 - $500,000 -$321.01 -$103.21 -$424.21 
Panel B: Scaled-Up Estimates (in millions of dollars) 
Definition of religious giving 
Change in 
Religious Giving 
Change in  
Secular Giving 
Change in  
Total Giving 
PSID definition -$2,292.22 -$603.99 -$2,896.21 
Expanded definition -$2,307.99 -$637.31 -$2,945.29 
The “expanded” definition of religious giving is the sum of PSID-defined religious giving and giving to the “other” 
category, as elicited in the PSID. Secular giving in this expanded definition includes donations to youth, art, education, 




Panel B shows the estimates from Panel A scaled up by the number of returns recorded in 
IRS Statistics of Income tables. The entire exercise was repeated for the expanded definition of 
giving described above to provide a range of estimates. It is notable that the estimates are not very 
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sensitive to small changes in the definition of religious giving. For all households making up to 
$500,000, I estimate that giving to churches (all causes) would decrease by about $2.3 billion ($2.9 
billion); non-church giving would decrease by about $600 - $630 million if donations to churches 
were no longer tax exempt. This represents about a 1.8% decrease in total giving to religious 
groups (1% decrease in total individual giving) in 2018 (Giving USA Foundation).  
 
 





 These estimates rest on the (arguably) unreasonable assumption that this once-itemized 
giving to churches would disappear. In fact, it is very likely that at least some of the itemized 
donations to churches would instead go to an organization that is tax-exempt. At the core of this 
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is a discussion about the substitutability of religious and secular donations: a question we do not 
really know the answer to. There has not been much of a systematic attempt at understanding how 
people trade off giving to their church with giving to secular charities, especially considering the 
nuance of tax incentives.50 Moreover, if households do substitute their previously-itemized church 
giving to another type of giving – instead of simply keeping that money – it is not clear what type 
of charity they will substitute to. It could be a religiously-affiliated or religious adjacent 
organization like World Relief or the Salvation Army. Or it could be a totally unrelated secular 
charity like a cancer research center, local food bank, or theatre. This is an open question in the 
field of economics that would be benefit from more attention. 
 
5. Church Finances 
5.1  Revenues 
It naturally follows that if donors decrease giving to churches then churches’ revenues will 
decrease.51 The decrease each church would experience is a function of many factors: the income 
and wealth composition of congregants, the itemization status of congregants, and the relative 
strictness of the church (Iannaccone 1988, 1992, 1994). This last point is a consequence of research 
in the intersection of the economics and sociology of religion: highly sectarian religious groups 
 
50 One example is Hill and Vaidyanathan (2011), who observe that families increase secular giving when they increase 
their religious giving. Hungerman (2013) looks at inter-denominational substitution in the aftermath of Catholic sex 
abuse scandals. Gruber and Hungerman (2008) have the closest attempt at substitution between church and non-church 
giving: using repeals in “blue laws,” they find that church attendance and church giving fall without a comparable 
decrease in non-church giving. These studies, while important, do not give us a robust understanding of the 
substitutability of church and non-church giving.  
51Churches can, and do, have multiple streams of revenue outside donations, including investments, rental income, 
and income from the sale of property, as well as unrelated business income which is taxed. Behavior around these 
sources of income would also be likely to change in the event of a policy that required reporting (Oxley, 2020) or 
otherwise altered their tax treatment. I focus analysis here on donation income, but another fruitful area of research is 
to analyze these other revenue streams.  
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institute strict behavioral rules to reduce free riding on the group public good, which results in 
stronger adherence to group norms, including donative behavior. Iannaccone (1988) shows that 
such groups are especially appealing for lower-income households. Relating to section 4, such 
“strictness of belief” can be thought of as individual churches creating a norm of highly inelastic 
price elasticities of giving. I do not have the ability in the present data to observe churches’ beliefs 
with sufficient granularity to control for or explicitly test these heterogeneous norms. This, again, 
is another fruitful area for additional research. 
As mentioned before, publicly available data on churches is difficult to come by. This is 
especially true for data that contains measures of the income and wealth distributions within a 
church alongside survey questions that could give a measure of “church strictness.” In the absence 
of such data, I use the self-identified religious preferences for the recorded household head in the 
PSID to group donors by belief (see section 3.2 for more details).52 I estimate the adjusted gross 
income composition within each belief group, which allows me to apply the average changes in 
giving from section 4 to observe how belief groups will be differentially impacted by the 
hypothetical policy. To avoid hyper-granular estimates, I use five AGI bins for this section of 
analysis, instead of ten as before. This protects me from having a belief-income group with, for 
example, 5 households. Figure 3 shows the proportion of households in each belief group that fall 
into these estimated federal adjusted gross income groups.  
On average, people who identify as Episcopalian or Jewish tend to be higher income while 
Pentecostals and Baptists are lower income. For example, 27% of self-identified Episcopalians 
 
52 Masci (2016) writes on the Pew Research Center’s findings using the 2014 Religious Landscape Study to measure 
the income make up of over 20 belief groups. However, they use family income instead of AGI which precludes me 
from applying my estimates from section 4 to look at the impact on belief-group revenues. 
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have a calculated AGI between $100,000 and $200,000, compared to 16.4% of Baptists and 6.7% 
of Pentecostals. It is important to note that these are not congregation-level estimates – these are 
“belief group” estimates. There could be (and likely is) considerable heterogeneity across 
congregations within belief groups in both the income distribution and relative strictness of norms. 
 
 





In the absence of more detailed data on the heterogeneity of individual congregations, I 
estimate changes in giving for a “typical” congregation in each belief group. I use the NCS to 
calculate the median size of a congregation for each belief group.53 Combining the congregation 
 
53 Churches sizes are subject to skewness, making the mean congregation size significantly larger than the median. 
 105 
size with the estimates of the income distribution within belief groups (Figure 3) and the estimated 
changes in church giving for each income group (Table 3, Panel A), I approximate how donation 
receipts will change for the “typical” or “median” congregation in each belief group. The results 
are displayed in Table 4.54 Naturally, I omit Atheist/Agnostic from this analysis because they are 
not recorded in the NCS as having congregations. For simplicity and tractability, I assume that the 
median congregation in each belief group has the average income distribution shown in Figure 3.  
 
 
Table 4: Estimated Change in Giving to Churches, by Belief Group 
Belief Group 
Median Number of 
Regularly Attending Adults 
Estimated Change 
in Giving 
Estimated % Change 
in Giving 
Baptist 150 -$2,723 -2.58% 
Catholic/Orthodox 1075 -$29,949 -3.45% 
Episcopalian 233 -$13,701 -5.43% 
Jewish 250 -$13,495 -5.27% 
LDS 135 -$4,717 -4.01% 
Lutheran 175 -$5,931 -3.87% 
Methodist 110 -$3,216 -3.64% 
Other Non-Christian 110 -$2,453 -3.09% 
Other Protestant 160 -$3,773 -3.12% 
Pentecostal 133 -$1,373 -1.77% 
Presbyterian 200 -$7,249 -4.07% 
 
 
Of course, larger congregations will experience a greater drop in giving because there are 
simply more people whose giving will be affected by the policy. I estimate that the median Catholic 
or Orthodox church would experience about a $30,000 (3.5%) decrease in donations as a result of 
this tax policy. On the low end, the median Pentecostal church would only see donations decrease 
by about 1.8%. To be sure, these estimates are flawed. Out of necessity they depend on the large 
 
54 Because I condense AGI bins between Tables 3 and 4, mean changes in religious giving per household for each bin 
must also be condensed. I take the average of the changes from Table 3 Column 2 for each combined bin (e.g. $0 - 
$30,000 gets an estimated average change in religious giving of 8 cents). 
 106 
– and unrealistic – assumption that the median congregation contains the average income 
distribution shown in Figure 3. In reality churches within belief groups are likely much more 
heterogenous in their congregation’s income makeup. Some churches have a high concentration 
of high-income households while others have a high concentration of low-income households, 
even within belief groups in similar geographic areas. Churches will experience greater (lower) 
decreases in donation income if their congregants are more homogeneously higher (lower) income. 
This logically follows from Table 4. If a larger proportion of a congregation makes above $200,000, 
more households in that church will experience a decreased tax incentive to donate and that church 
will experience larger corresponding decreases in donation income, even accounting for the 
inelasticity of church donations. This implies that the hypothetical policy would differentially 
impact churches and could theoretically not cause a noticeable decrease in donation income for 
predominantly low-income churches. Further, the NCS reports the number of participating adults 
in each congregation sampled. This is not necessarily the number of members or even givers. The 
set of donors within a congregation could indeed be smaller than the set of participants. 
5.2  Expenses 
 Turning to churches’ expenses, we have even less reliable data with which to make specific, 
informed conjectures about the consequences of the policy. Churches are not required to file Form 
990 with the IRS like other tax-exempt nonprofits. This means there is not a systematic way to 
assess the assets or expenditures of churches aside from surveys, which are rarely gathered in a 
way that is nationally representative while also containing the detail necessary. The lack of data 
makes analysis speculative, even for government agencies (Kenyon and Langley, 2011; Gravelle 
 107 
and Sherlock, 2009). Still I attempt to provide broad, rough estimates of how churches would be 
affected, with the above-mentioned data problems as a caveat.  
 There are two dimensions of the hypothetical policy for churches expenses: changes in 
federal tax treatment and changes in state and local tax treatment. Under Assumption 3, all state 
and local governments will remove the tax-exempt status of churches in the hypothetical policy 
world. Relaxing this assumption introduces a great deal of complexity to analysis, which is 
discussed below. I discuss each dimension in turn. 
5.2.1  Federal 
 As mentioned in section 2, churches get multiple benefits from federal tax-exemption. 
They are exempted from paying taxes on donation income and other income sources that are 
related to their “business” – unrelated business income is subject to special tax rules (Internal 
Revenue Service Publication 1828). The ministers housing allowance permits churches’ ministers 
(broadly defined) to omit the fair market value of their home or a geographically-appropriate 
housing “stipend” from their gross income. Gravelle et al. (2019) report that in fiscal year 2019, 
the federal government forewent $700 million in tax revenue due to the ministers housing 
allowance exclusion. In relative terms, that amount is quite small: the housing allowance exclusion 
constituted just 1.5% of federal individual charitable tax expenditures. For comparison, deductions 
for charitable contributions to educational institutions constituted 15.6%.  
 Removing churches’ tax-exempt status would also remove this housing allowance 
deduction. Some or all of the money that was distributed as a housing allowance must be moved 
to taxable income, which necessarily means ministers’ gross income is higher and therefore their 
after-tax income is lower. Churches could permit their ministers’ take-home pay to drop or they 
 108 
could increase their salary to mitigate the loss, which would require increasing their expenses. 
Salary data for ministers is notoriously ambiguous so it’s entirely unclear how to predict if, how 
many, or how much churches would increase compensation for their ministers in light of a policy 
that ended the housing allowance deduction. However it is clear that removing this specific 
deduction would increase federal government tax revenues by $700 million (at least, it would have 
in 2019) and the additional burden on churches’ expenses is likely quite small. 
Taxes paid on donation income would much more drastically increase churches’ expenses 
and decrease their after-tax income. However, it is not clear what tax rules would be applied to 
churches when removing their tax exemption (e.g. corporate tax rates). As an upper bound, we can 
assume churches are taxed the top corporate tax rate for federal income taxes. Then for each dollar 
received by a church, their expenses would increase by 21 cents (assuming away the various 
vagaries of the corporate income tax code). Calculations aside it is straightforward to understand 
how this will impact churches: they will pay more in federal income taxes than they do now which 
will increase expenses, all else equal. 
5.2.2  State and Local 
One of the largest benefits for nonprofits from their tax-exempt status is not having to pay 
property taxes (Kenyon and Langley, 2011). Churches especially hold a nontrivial amount of 
property that goes untaxed by state and local governments. Under current tax law, state and local 
governments have the ability to exempt nonprofits from sales and property taxes, which virtually 
all do. The amount of foregone sales tax and state income tax revenue for nonprofits is significantly 
smaller than the amount of foregone property tax revenue on average (Kenyon and Langley, 2011). 
This is conjecture, of course, because there is little systematic data on foregone tax revenue at the 
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state and local level, in part due to the heterogeneity in local tax policies. For example, even within 
California the sales tax rate is 7.25% but can be as high as 10.25% in some localities. 
As in section 5.2.1, where data lacks conjecture abounds. To get a general idea of how 
significant the sales tax exemption is I look to Table 16 in Gravelle and Sherlock (2009), which 
estimate that nonprofits were exempted from $3.3 billion in sales taxes in 2008. This is not only 
churches though: Table 4 of Gravelle and Sherlock (2009) reports that 21.64% of registered 
charities were categorized as “religion related, spiritual development.” Directly applying this 
percentage to the sales taxes exempted, I estimate that churches were exempted from about $714 
million. This is of course a very rough estimate that makes several assumptions about the 
distribution of local tax rates and churches, the purchasing behavior of churches, and more. In 
addition, churches are not required to register with the IRS, so the “percent registered” estimate is 
likely incorrect as well. As such, these estimates should be taken as highly speculative. 
However, it is reasonable to assume that if churches were required to pay sales and state 
income taxes, their expenses would increase and they would likely purchase less because the 
relative price of goods consumed by the church is increasing. It also follows that churches in states 
with lower sales tax will be less affected and therefore will experience smaller changes in demand 
and smaller increases in expenses. So, while the exact magnitudes of changes remain an open 
question until better data is made available, it is clear that church expenses would increase 
heterogeneously across geographic locations. 
Following from the assertion by Kenyon and Langley (2011) that property tax exemptions 
are higher than sales and state income tax exemptions, it seems clear that requiring churches to 
begin paying property taxes will have the largest impact on their expenses. It is difficult to estimate 
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precisely how much property is owned by nonprofits, let alone churches, so foregone property 
taxes are similarly difficult to estimate.  
To get a rough idea of exactly how much churches are exempt from paying in property 
taxes, I look again at Table 16 in Gravelle and Sherlock (2009). They estimate that state and local 
tax subsidies for all nonprofits via property tax exemptions totaled between $17 billion and $32 
billion in 2008. The breadth of this range reflects how difficult it is to accurately estimate foregone 
property tax revenue. They also note that “Property tax estimates were increased 33% to account 
for religious property.” Using this 33% adjustment, I back out how much their property tax 
exemption estimates were inflated to account for churches. This evaluates to churches across the 
U.S. being exempted from between $4.2 billion and $7.9 billion in property taxes in 2008. Brauer 
(2017) uses the NCS to estimate that there were about 414,000 in 2006 (which declined to 384,000 
by 2012). Then using the number of churches in 2006 and property tax exemptions in 2008, I get 
the (very) rough estimate that the average church saved between $10,000 and $18,000 by not 
paying property taxes in 2008. Of course, not all churches own their building and some churches 
own vast amounts of property, so this average also reflects the skewness of property ownership 
among churches.55 Regardless, it is clear that churches that own their building would see their 
expenses increase significantly. 
Despite the data difficulties documented in this section, it is clear that increases from state 
and local taxes on sales and property would significantly increase churches’ expenses. A related, 
vitally important question is the distribution of how these expenses would burden churches. For 
example, relatively richer churches (with more donation income) are more likely to own property 
 
55 As one example, in 2010, Lakewood Church in Houston, TX bought its property for $7.5 million (Houston 
Chronicle). 
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so they will be more strongly impacted by policy requiring the church to pay property taxes. Low-
income churches – who may be less likely to own their building – would not experience the same 
expense increase from property taxes. These churches would, however, still need to pay taxes on 
donation income, a non-trivial expense increase. 
 
6. Discussion and Summary 
6.1 Relaxing Assumptions 
Section 3.1 outlines three assumptions to make analysis more tractable. However, it is very 
likely that these oversimplify the real environment in which such a policy might occur. I briefly 
consider the implications of relaxing each assumption in turn. 
Assuming that only “churches” lose tax exemption is definitionally problematic because 
religious organizations are variable in structure. Churches often serve multiple purposes. For 
example, a church may operate a soup kitchen out of its building which could be encompassed 
under that churches’ operations or legally separated as a distinct entity. In the former, the soup 
kitchen is part of a church; in the latter, it is not. There are also religiously-motivated nonprofits 
that are not churches, such as the Salvation Army or World Relief. 56  Further, parachurch 
organizations such as campus ministries and evangelistic missions agencies that operate separately 
from churches also provide religious services, and church associations and conventions (e.g. 
Southern Baptist Convention) provide religious support, but are distinct from houses of worship. 
It’s also unclear if (and how) churches would try to restructure because of the policy, becoming 
registered “secular” nonprofits organized around the charitable aspect of their mission. Under such 
 
56 While in some locations the Salvation Army is organized as a church, in others it is a registered 501c3 more similar 
to a secular charity. 
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a scheme the religious services would be included as another component of their activity but their 
primary purpose – at least legally – would be their charitable work. This is of course pure 
speculation and is a product of the legal structure of the policy as much as churches’ behavior.57 It 
logically follows that the more expansive the definition of religious organization, the larger 
decreases in giving and charitable activity we would observe. 
An additional complication is the treatment of areligious (e.g. secular humanist) 
organizations. Such groups are not organized around a religious belief, but around a lack of a 
religious belief – a philosophy. Yet a policy that retains such groups’ tax exemption tacitly favors 
a belief system (one that actively disavows religious belief). 
Because it is not straightforward to define a religious organization, it is not straightforward 
to understand how a policy would be designed to remove tax exemption for religious organizations. 
One solution is to not remove tax exemption for all religious (and areligious) organizations but 
only those which are in violation of the law – namely, civil rights law. This relaxes the second 
assumption described in section 3.2. As mentioned above, this is arguably a more plausible way 
the tax treatment of religious organizations would develop, because there is already precedent from 
cases against religious schools like Bob Jones University v. United States. Under such a policy, 
nonprofits may retain their tax-exempt status if they are in compliance with federal law; those not 
in compliance – for example, by racially discriminating in hiring or refusing to marry same-sex 
couples – would lose their tax exemption. 
 
57 Churches could not legally reorganize as “clubs” under, for example, section 501(c)7 without undergoing dramatic 
changes in activity: most other forms of nonprofits in section 501 require a degree of exclusivity that is antithetical to 
most church operations. 
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A policy like this would be both legally and analytically complex. This would necessarily 
mean all churches must register as nonprofits with the IRS to receive exemption so that some may 
lose it when they violate the law. Implementation (i.e. determination of exemption) would either 
need to be on a case-by-case basis (as legal violations occurred) or pre-emptive: the IRS determines 
in advance if a religious organization can be tax-exempt based on whether their stated beliefs align 
with civil rights law. It is clear how this quickly becomes complicated. Heterogeneous treatment 
of religious organizations makes it much more difficult to predict the policy’s impact on churches 
and religiosity.  
Take as an example Christian beliefs on homosexuality: there is a wide range of 
perceptions, beliefs, and actions even within church networks that are evolving over time. Accurate 
estimation would require an understanding of the distribution of beliefs on various dimensions of 
Christian treatment of homosexuality (participation, leadership, employment, marriage, etc.) 
alongside information on church size, income makeup, and tax rates. This data is virtually 
nonexistent. There is the additional complication of dynamics: churches that were once uncertain 
or mixed in belief (e.g. about same-sex marriage) may converge more firmly onto a doctrine, which 
could change their congregation’s composition as people respond to the change in beliefs. 
However, regardless of the implementation, allowing churches that are in compliance with civil 
rights law to be tax-exempt will mitigate the decrease in giving and church activity because the set 
of affected churches is smaller. 
As mentioned above, there is a high degree of heterogeneity in income, sales, and property 
tax rates. Allowing for state or local governments to independently decide on enforcing tax 
exemption for religious organizations (i.e. relax the third assumption above) would likewise 
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complicate analysis dramatically. It is also unclear how such interactions would work between 
government levels.58  
It is plausible that heterogeneous implementation would follow the concentration of 
religious belief. States or municipalities with high concentrations of religious citizens would be 
pressured to retain tax exemption for churches; areas with a majority nonreligious population 
would likely not. While it is clear that the above-estimated changes would be mitigated if some 
churches retained tax-exemption, it is not at all straightforward to accurately estimate the 
distributional impact of the heterogeneous beliefs and taxation. 
6.2 Summary 
I estimate how a policy that removed the tax-exempt status of religious organizations would 
impact donations, churches’ revenues, and churches’ expenses. I show that donations to churches 
will drop if they lose their tax-exempt status. This is driven by the increased tax price associated 
with those donations. Approximately 25% of itemizing households would stop itemizing if they 
could no longer include their religious contributions. I also show that the consequences of this 
decreased giving are heterogeneous across belief groups. Within belief groups, I reason that 
churches with higher concentrations of high income households will experience a greater shock to 
donation income because these congregants are more likely to experience tax price changes, 
though I cannot show this empirically due to a lack of available data. I estimate that secular giving 
will also decrease, though not to the same magnitude as religious giving, because households 
experience a change in their tax price of secular giving when religious giving is no longer 
itemizable. 
 
58 For example: if a state retains tax exemption for churches, would that affect their federal funding? Can households 
include their state taxes on their federal tax returns if they were adjusted with donations to churches?  
 115 
Despite a sever lack of data on churches’ revenues and expenses, I attempt to estimate how 
they would be impacted by losing their tax-exempt status. Donation income would decrease in 
accord with the previous paragraph. There would be an increase in federal income tax expenses as 
donation income becomes taxable. At the same time, churches would start paying state and local 
taxes on purchases, income (in some states), and property. I discuss how paying property taxes 
would be especially burdensome for churches, primarily for churches that own large amounts of 
property. These estimates are greatly inhibited by insufficient data – they should be viewed at most 
as suggestive evidence in the direction of an effect, not certain claims about the magnitude of 
changes in church expenses. The uncertainty should also be motivation for more reliable data and 
more rigorous research in this area. 
Taken together, if churches lost their tax-exempt status, most would likely experience a 
decrease in donation income with a simultaneous, significant increase in their expenses. This is of 
course subject to a great deal of heterogeneous church characteristics. Churches with congregants 
that are primarily low-income would not experience a significant loss in donation income because 
very few households in the congregation would have different tax incentives to give. Similarly, 
these churches are probably less likely to own property which means they would not experience 
the large increase in property tax expenses. That does not imply immunity from the impacts of the 
policy but the effect could certainly be muted.  
I believe this topic warrants more empirical investigation. There are many constraints to 
effectively estimating the consequences of removing churches’ tax exemption, primarily the 
limited availability of data. Access to better data is crucial for government agencies and researchers 
to generate meaningful predictions about such a policy. There are several related questions that 
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researchers could address in the meantime, including the substitutability of religious and secular 
giving, separating tax price elasticities of religious and secular giving, and estimating the 
distribution of churches’ “strictness” of belief in the U.S. and what that implies for their responses 
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CHARITY BEGINS AT HOME:  
A LAB-IN-THE-FIELD EXPERIMENT ON CHARITABLE GIVING59  
 
1. Introduction 
Charitable organizations vary along many dimensions, including their geographic level of 
operation. Organizations can operate at an international, national, state-wide, or local level. It is 
unclear, however, whether and how donors differentiate between charities at different levels that 
have similar missions. Do donors consider the reach of the charity and direct impact of their 
donations? Do they prefer to donate to a local organization where they will have a concentrated 
impact, or to a larger organization with broader reach? Little is known about how donors make 
tradeoffs between organizational characteristics in making their donation decisions. This study 
addresses this question by conducting controlled, lab-in-the-field experiments where subjects 
make real donation decisions to charitable organizations from a fixed budget. 
In this paper, we report the results of a comparative dictator game (CDG hereafter) 
experiment conducted in two Texas towns. Our study systematically varies the organizational 
level, including national (N), state (S), local (L), and individual person (P) organizational levels. 
Specifically, we use a series of dictator game (DG) decisions. Subjects make four separate 
allocation decisions, distributing a fixed endowment between themselves and a charitable recipient 
at each of these different levels. One is selected randomly for payment. In a separate game, the 
 
59 Previously published with C. Eckel and R. Wilson in Games, 9(4), p. 95. 
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selected dictator game (SDG hereafter), we ask subjects to indicate which of the decisions they 
would most like to implement. 
A considerable body of research uses lab experiments to study charitable giving. The 
superior control of the lab provides an ideal methodology for addressing the impact of fundraising 
practices, examining motives for giving and testing theories of altruism (Vesterlund, 2016). Even 
though the decisions made in lab experiments are “real donation” decisions (Eckel and Grossman, 
1996), they have been criticized for their use of convenience samples of undergraduate students. 
In this study we retain the control of lab-type protocols, but recruit a random sample of adult 
subjects. This allows us to test the effect of the level of the organization in a tightly controlled 
setting, but with a broader sample of participants. This methodology is ideally suited to the 
research question. Indeed, the question cannot be answered with observational data, as no data are 
available that show such tradeoffs at the level of the individual decision maker. 
We are not the first to use a comparative approach to examine variations in dictator-game 
giving. For example, Candelo et al. (2019) used a CDG experimental design to test the effect of 
recipient characteristics on donations in adult populations. They found that people increase giving 
to more “worthy” recipients, such as people with disabilities, single mothers, and people with more 
children. Candelo et al. (2018) include an appendix describing the initial development of the CDG 
using lab experiments. Others, like Fong (2007) and Fong and Luttmer (2009) vary specific 
recipients in dictator games to assess biases due to race or need. 
The work most similar to ours is Li et al. (2011), where the authors use federal, state and 
local levels in their study of dictator giving to government organizations in a lab experiment with 
a student sample. They find that subjects have a preference for the mission and geographic level 
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of operation. People were more likely to give a non-zero amount towards cancer research and 
disaster relief than education enhancement and parks and wildlife. Furthermore, giving 
monotonically increased in operation level (national > state > local) for disaster relief organizations 
(but not all missions). 
Our study focuses on disaster relief work by private charities and differs from Li et al. 
(2011) in two important ways: We use adult participants in the field, and we add an additional 
recipient—an anonymous individual in the subjects’ town. This is the first study to vary the levels 
at which charities operate in a sample of adult participants, and to include an individual in the 
decision set. This allows us to ask whether adults embedded in a community differentiate giving 
among charity-levels while also considering giving to an individual. These differences motivate 
our hypotheses in Section 2.1. 
We find that subjects give more to an anonymous person than to any of the three charitable 
organizations in the CDG, consistent with prior literature discussed in more detail below. Similar 
to Li et al. (2011), we find that dictator giving to a national organization is higher than to a state 
organization. Contrary to Li et al. (2011), however, we find that average donations by community 
members are higher to local organizations compared to state organizations and statistically 
equivalent across national and local organizations. This creates a U-shaped revealed-preference 
giving curve across levels, which is verified by subjects’ selections in the subsequent SDG. We 
explore how this behavior correlates with socio-demographics and measurements of trust in people 
and in institutions. We also discuss possible explanations for why our findings contradict those of 
Li et al. (2011). 
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2. Experimental Design and Implementation 
2.1.  Hypotheses 
As described above, Li et al. (2011) find that giving to disaster relief monotonically 
increases with the level of operation. This is a surprising conclusion, given the extensive charitable 
giving literature around directed giving (Eckel et al., 2017; Li et al., 2015) and the identifiable 
victim effect. The identifiable victim effect, described in the charitable giving literature, is the 
tendency of donors to give more when a single recipient is identified. This is because they are an 
“identifiable” instead of a “statistical” victim (Jenni and Loewenstein, 2003). Even a weak form 
of identifiability, without accompanying information, can increase caring (Small and Loewenstein, 
2003). For a meta-analysis of the identifiable victim effect, see Lee and Feeley (2016). 
When making contributions to a charity, we propose that donors in the CDG consider both 
the reach of an organization and the direct impact of their contribution, as well as the potential 
tradeoff between them. For example, national charities have a broader reach than local 
organizations, and may be better able to allocate funds efficiently, where they are most needed. 
This is a potential explanation for the behavior observed in Li et al. (2011). Yet a single 
contribution has a very small impact on national-level needs. By contrast the reach of a local 
charity is much narrower, but a contribution can have a much higher relative impact. At the most 
extreme, a contribution to a person has the most impact, but the narrowest reach. 
All of the charities we use service anonymous victims. To make our “identifiable victim” 
comparable, we keep that person’s identity anonymous. This allows us to better test whether 
impact and reach come to mind when people consider their contributions. We expect individual 
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recipients to receive the largest amount, from which we can conclude that subjects value impact 
over reach. This forms our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: When presented with separate giving decisions to national, state, and 
local organizations and an anonymous individual, subjects give more to the 
individual than to any other level. 
 
 
Impact and reach surely interact with each other differently when donors consider where 
and how much to give to organizations instead of identified individuals. Since each of the decisions 
in our CDG is independent, we propose that subjects consider the charities differently. We 
therefore use the results of Li et al. (2011) – subjects’ revealed preference rank of charity level 
(national > state > local) – to form our second hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 2: Beyond giving to the individual, subjects’ donations will be 
monotonically increasing with the level of the organization’s operation. 
 
 
We believe this result from Li et al. (2011) arises because the relative impact of a donation 
beyond an individual becomes either less important or less clear, so subjects will switch to 
considering an organization’s reach. Our experiment is not designed to pull apart these two 
possible mechanisms; however, we propose that, in a comparative-statics analysis, preferences for 
the reach of an organization are mediated by prior beliefs about the relative effectiveness of aid at 
a given level (national, state, or local). We therefore expect some measurement of beliefs about 
trust in institutions (operating at the state or federal level) or trust in people (focused locally or an 
individual) to have a statistically significant correlation with giving behavior across organizations. 
Running this experiment with adults—particularly adults who have experienced natural 
disasters—is therefore valuable because we expect their beliefs to be more developed and informed 
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than student subjects who may or may not have experienced natural disasters. This forms two 
additional testable hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3a: Trust in institutions, as a proxy for beliefs about the effectiveness 
of aid at national and state levels, has a significant effect on giving to national and 
state charities. Furthermore, trust in people, as a proxy for beliefs about the 
effectiveness of aid at the local level or to a person, has a significant effect on the 
giving to the local charity and the individual recipient. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: Age is significantly and heterogeneously correlated with giving 
amounts at each level. 
 
Because we cannot a priori state how beliefs about organization level effectiveness change 
with age or trust in institutions or people, we remain agnostic on predicting the direction or 
magnitude of these coefficients. We simply hypothesize there to be heterogeneous preferences for 
organization level by age and trust measurements. 
When making the second decision (the SDG), subjects have already selected their 
contribution level for each organization. They were unaware of the SDG when making the CDG 
decisions. In choosing which CDG decision they prefer, subjects reveal which recipient they prefer 
to give to among the four possibilities, conditional on the amounts they have allocated to each. For 
example, when forced to make a decision about how much to give to each charity, subjects may 
choose different amounts depending on the perceived benefit of the contribution. However, when 
asked to choose, a subject might prefer to avoid their more generous decision, and instead opt for 
the one where they gave the least. Indeed, this is what Candelo et al. (2019) find in a low-income, 
high minority population with a similar experimental design: subjects allocated the most to the 
‘most worthy’ recipients, but subsequently chose in the SDG the recipient to which they gave the 
least in the CDG. This informs our final hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 4: In the selected dictator game, the majority of subjects will choose the 
recipient to which they sent the least in the comparative dictator game. 
 
This argument has some of the same flavor as work on “avoiding the ask” in charitable 
giving. DellaVigna et al. (2012) place flyers on door knobs with a return time for solicitation, 
allowing households to seek or avoid the fundraiser. The flyer reduces the number of people 
opening the door, effectively “avoiding the ask”. Andreoni et al. (2017) placed Salvation Army 
bell ringers near entrances at a mall around Christmastime, experimentally altering the difficulty 
of avoiding the ask. Making avoidance difficult increased donations. In comparison, we give 
subjects the option to ‘avoid’ implementing the previous CDG decisions. This decision allows us 
to further uncover their preferences for giving. 
2.2.  Sample and General Study Design 
The real-donation dictator game was embedded in a larger study60 carried out in 2010 in 
two Texas towns whose primary focus was on natural disaster preparedness. The study included 
survey components and lab-in-the-field incentivized decisions. The 2010 data collection was the 
second wave of a multi-year study. Subjects were originally recruited in 2009 and participated in 
a series of incentivized decisions to elicit standard economic preferences. The second wave of the 
study was carried out between 14 April 2010 and 14 June 2010. A total of 310 subjects participated 
in this wave. The study was conducted in two communities (population < 20,000) that were 
selected based on their risks from natural disasters and for their comparability in terms of the local 
economy and the characteristics of their citizens.  
 
60 This study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki, and the protocol was approved by the 
Institutional Review Board of: Rice University, 09-0674X, approved 26 May 2009; University of Texas at Dallas, 
MR09-51, approved 29 May 2009; and Texas A&M University, IR2013-3020, approved 6 May 2013. 
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In each community, we recruited a sample of adult residents from specific neighborhoods 
that were matched according to demographic characteristics (income, employment status, and age) 
using census data. For the 2009 wave, recruiters were given a random sample of households in the 
neighborhoods based on tax parcel information. Participants were contacted at their homes and 
asked to participate in a study that included a decision-making component and a survey. In order 
to augment the initial random sample, we used a snowball sampling strategy, asking subjects who 
participated to help recruit others in their neighborhood.61 Subjects signed up to participate in a 
specific experimental session. These sessions averaged 15 subjects and lasted approximately 2.5 
hours. Sessions were conducted at a local community center by researchers from Rice University 
and the University of Texas at Dallas. Participants were paid $20 for completing the survey and 
could earn additional money for incentivized decision-making tasks; average earnings were $80. 
To accommodate different levels of education among the subjects, instructions and 
protocols were designed to be as simple as possible. Subjects had ‘booklets’ with visual images to 
aid instruction, and subjects were instructed using posters with the same images. Experimenters 
followed a script, and walked through each possible decision and the monetary consequences of 
the decisions. Subjects completed seven different tasks in a fixed order with no feedback. The first 
task elicited risk preferences using the gamble-choice task adapted from (Eckel and Grossman, 
2008). The second task had subjects making choices between amounts they would prefer to receive 
either in a week or in six months (a time discounting task). The third and fourth tasks were 
variations on the trust game (Berg et al., 1995). Tasks five and six are the concern of this paper, 
 
61 Each participant was given two cards containing information about the study, along with a code number identifying 
the participant, and told to give these cards to their neighbors. They received a $20 bonus for every new recruit 
(up to two). A total of 51 additional subjects were recruited in this manner. 
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and consist of two variations on the dictator game, as described below. Of these six tasks, one was 
randomly selected for payment, using a transparent randomizing device: one subject selected a 
sealed envelope from a clear plastic tub containing many sealed envelopes, each containing one of 
the tasks. Everyone in the session was paid for the task that was selected, and subjects received 
feedback (learned the outcome) only on that task. At the end of the experiments, subjects 
completed the final task, a survey collecting demographic information and household 
characteristics, as well as survey measures of trust in institutions and other attitudinal questions. 
These booklets and surveys were checked for completeness by an experimenter and each 
individual was privately paid and debriefed.  
2.3.  Dictator Game Designs 
In the first of the two dictator game tasks, Task 5 (CDG), subjects were asked to make four 
separate allocation decisions, dividing $60 between themselves and an organization or individual. 
(see Figure 1). As shown in Table 1, the four target organizations were the American Red Cross 
Disaster Relief Fund (national level), the United Way (state level for town 1, local level for town 
2), the Salvation Army (state level for town 2, local level for town 1) and a person in the town who 
was a victim of a fire, identified by the local fire department (individual). 
 
 
Table 1: Recipient Organizations in the Comparative Dictator Game 









Individual selected by 














Figure 1: Comparative Dictator Game Decision Sheet 
 
Decision sheets used by subjects when deciding allocations between themselves and charities in the Comparative 




Since we list different organizations at each level, it is possible that heterogeneous giving 
preferences across levels are actually heterogeneous giving preferences across organizations. To 
help mitigate this, we block the state and local charities (see Table 1). More importantly, the 
decision for each organization was framed around disaster relief during the experiment. An excerpt 
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from the instructions given at the beginning of the experiment and Task 5, which included 
descriptions of the organizations that make their disaster relief work salient, is included in 
Appendix C. With this very specific frame, we believe that subjects were more likely to be 
considering the effectiveness of disaster relief at each level rather than the organizations’ ability 
to implement disaster relief or the relative importance of disaster relief in the organization’s 
portfolio. 
Subjects were told that if the task was chosen for payment, then, at the time of payment, 
the subject would randomly choose from four cards indicating the four possible decisions. The 
decision for the organization on that card would be implemented. Subjects were told that a check 
would be written to the recipient and were invited to watch the check being written, placed in an 
addressed envelope addressed, and taken to the nearest mailbox. In the event that the fourth 
decision was chosen a member of the research team would deliver the check and the recipient’s 
identity would not be revealed. Instructions describing the experiment’s payment process is 
included in Appendix C. 
In Task 6 (SDG) subjects were asked to choose which of the four decisions from Task 5 
they would prefer to be implemented. These choices are given in Figure 2. Subjects were 
reminded that they had just made four allocation choices. They were told that if this task was 
selected for payment, the decision they choose would be implemented. The goal of this task was 
to see if subjects had a favored charity from the fixed list that we provided them. Subjects merely 






Figure 2: Selected Dictator Game Decision Sheet 
 
Decision sheets used by subjects when deciding which charity from Task 5 to choose as the sole recipient in the 




3. Data and Aggregate Results 
We pool subjects from the two towns in our sample (pooled n = 310). We create a panel 
data set using each of the subjects’ four allocation decisions for analysis. The pooled sample is 
58% female, predominantly white (64%), with 36% having “high” church attendance (at least once 
a week). Hispanics are the second largest racial group (26%). The average age of our sample is 45. 
Our participants are mostly low income and have low education—55% report earnings below 
$30,000 per year and 43% have no college education. Table 2 describes in detail the socio-
demographic composition of our sample. 
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Table 2: Summary of Demographic Variables 
 Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Male 129 0.418 0.494 
White 200 0.645 0.479 
Hispanic 80 0.258 0.438 
High church attendance 110 0.355 0.479 
Age (in years) 310 45.48 16.03 
Married 141 0.455 0.498 
At least some college education 173 0.571 0.495 
Low income (HH income < $30K) 166 0.546 0.498 
Male, White, Hispanic, Married, At least some college education, and Low income are dummy variables equal to one 
if the category is true. High church attendance = 1 if subject reports attending church at least once a week. 
 
 
In addition to socio-demographics, subjects responded to survey questions assessing trust 
in different organizations and individuals. A selection of these questions was used to calculate two 
additive scales measuring trust in institutions and trust in people (Table 3). The “Trust in 
Institutions” index uses five items to capture subjects’ underlying trust in institutions (Cronbach’s 
alpha = 0.84). The “Trust in People” index uses three items to capture trust in people (Cronbach’s 
alpha = 0.61). The questions used to calculate each index can be found in Appendix C. Subjects 
report a relatively high trust in people and, on average, are more trusting of people than institutions. 
We include these measures as covariate controls, reasoning that trust in institutions might be 
important for donation decisions that reach beyond the local level. 
 
Table 3: Summary of Calculated Attitudinal Indices 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max No. Items Cronbach’s Alpha 
Trust in Institutions 2.412 0.714 1 4 5 0.84 




Figure 3 shows the average amount sent to each charity level. Table 4 in provides 
corresponding summary statistics. Panel A includes the average amount sent out of the $60 
endowment, the probability of a subject sending a positive amount, and the average amount sent 
by donors (conditional on a positive donation). Panel B provides the same measures by 
characteristics with amounts pooled by subject – they reflect an average across all four decisions. 
 
 
Figure 3: Average Giving, by Charity Level 
 




















Panel A: Comparative Dictator Game by Level 
National charity 22.17 0.871 25.45 
State charity 20.98 0.871 24.09 
Local charity 23.65 0.877 26.95 
Person in town 30.23 0.919 32.88 
Panel B: Comparative Dictator Game Demographics 
Male 23.99 0.866 27.70 
Female 24.49 0.897 27.29 
High church attendance 27.48 0.918 29.92 
Low church attendance 22.49 0.866 25.96 
College 23.50 0.855 27.50 
No college 25.26 0.925 27.32 
HH income < $30,000 22.56 0.883 25.57 
HH income ≥ $30,000 26.38 0.888 29.71 







National charity 28 35  
State charity 20 67  
Local charity 32 83  
Person 134 29  
Panel D: % Choosing Each Level in Selected Dictator Game 
National charity 16.77   
State charity 8.39   
Local charity 23.23   
Person in town 51.61   
N=310 for Panels A, B, and D. In Panel C, subjects were omitted if they sent the same amount to every level. High 
church attendance = 1 if subject reports attending church at least once a week. College = 1 if subject reports having at 




In Figure3, we see that subjects gave $20–$30 on average, or 33–50 percent of their $60 
endowments. Average giving was highest for the individual, and the lowest for the state-level 
charity. Even though gifts to the local charity clearly benefit local victims, subjects are even more 
likely to donate, and to give more, to a specific local victim. Subjects allocate more to national 
than state (t-test, p = 0.06, Wilcoxon signed rank test, p = 0.02) and more to local than national (t-
test, p = 0.04, Wilcoxon, p = 0.16) or state (t-test, p = 0.00, Wilcoxon, p = 0.00). Subjects allocate 
a statistically and economically significant amount ($6.58–$9.25) more to the individual than to 
any other level (t-test, p = 0.00, Wilcoxon, p = 0.00 for all levels). We also see a higher probability 
of giving to the individual recipient. In particular, 91.94% of the subjects allocated a non-zero 
amount to the individual—4.2%–4.8% more than any other level (t-test, p = 0.00, Wilcoxon, p = 
0.00 for all levels). 
Turning to demographic differences in Panel B of Table 4, we see similar levels and 
likelihoods of giving by women and men. Likewise, there is not a statistical difference in 
propensity to give or amount given between more and less religious people or people with higher 
or lower income. Subjects without any college education are seven percentage points more likely 
to give some positive amount than those with at least some college education (t-test, p = 0.03, 
Mann–Whitney, p = 0.03), give $1.76 more on average (t-test, p = 0.03), and have significantly 
different giving distributions (Mann–Whitney p = 0.00). 
Since each decision was made independently subjects could give the same amount to each 
level, making their max and min equivalent. We call these subjects consistent givers and cover a 
more detailed analysis of them in Section 4.3. Among those who discriminated in the amount they 
gave by treatment, 134 (29) subjects gave more (less) to the individual person than to any other 
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target. There is a clear revealed preference for charity level by where subjects gave their personal 
max and min amounts (seen in Panel C of Table 4). 
In the SDG, subjects indicated which of the four decisions they most preferred to 
implement. More than half of subjects (51.6%) chose the individual person target, which reveals a 
strong preference for an identifiable victim. Interestingly, the choices in the SDG mirror the pattern 
of giving in the CDG, with a U-shaped revealed preference curve across level distance: 16.8 
selected the national charity, 8.4 percent the state, and 23.2 percent of subjects selected the local 
level charity decision. However, not every difference is statistically significant and there is likely 
level-specific heterogeneous behavior, so a more thorough statistical treatment is necessary. 
 
4. Regression Results 
The aggregate results show that people differentiate among charities. We now focus on the 
relationship between subjects’ characteristics and their donation behavior. First, we use the 
comparative dictator game (CDG) subject-level panel to analyze the full sample. Second, we break 
the regressions apart by CDG level to investigate level-specific heterogeneous behavior among 
characteristics. Third, we discuss the consistent givers who gave the same amount to each recipient 
level. Last, we examine what subjects choose in the SDG and offer explanations for this behavior. 
4.1.  Comparative Dictator Game: Pooled Sample 
Donating behavior was restricted to be between $0 and $60, so we use a Tobit model to 
account for subjects who might have preferred to give less than $0 or more than $60 in the absence 
of this restriction. We use four different specifications to evaluate the relationship between these 
characteristics and giving: 
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𝐺𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝑳𝜸 + 𝜀𝑖  (1) 
𝐺𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝑳𝜸 + 𝑫𝜷 + 𝜀𝑖  (2) 
𝐺𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝑳𝜸 + 𝑰𝜹 + 𝜀𝑖  (3) 
𝐺𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝑳𝜸 + 𝑫𝜷 + 𝑰𝜹 + 𝜀𝑖  (4) 
where 𝑳 is a vector of level indicator controls (national, local, and person); 𝑫 is a vector of 
demographic variables (age, male, high church attendance, college, and low income); and 𝑰 is a 
vector of our constructed trust indices (institutions and people). 𝜀𝑖  is the subject-specific error 
term. 𝑳 will capture any level-specific differences in giving, independent of demographics, with 
state as the control variable. Based on Figure 3 and Panel A of Table 4, we expect the coefficients 
on national, local, and person to be positive and significant.  
There is a large, existing literature on individual differences in altruistic behavior in the 
lab, typically measured by variations on dictator games. Gender has been extensively studied: in 
standard dictator games, where the recipient is an anonymous individual, women give more than 
men (Eckel and Grossman, 1998; Engel , 2011), although the gender difference may reverse if the 
relative price of giving is sufficiently low (Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001). In “real donation” 
experiments (Eckel and Grossman, 1996), women also tend to give more than men, though this 
difference may vary by context. Two papers survey studies of charitable giving across 
methodologies and summarize findings on many factors including gender, age, education, 
religiosity, etc. (Bekkers and Wiepking, 2011; 2012). Age, education, and income are consistently 
positively correlated with giving, but gender and religiosity show mixed results. From this 
literature, we predict age, education, and household income will have a consistent, significant, 
positive effect on giving. Since the literature is not entirely clear on how our other demographic 
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covariates correlate with dictator game decisions, especially across each of our three non-human 
recipients (charities), we use the summary information in Panel B of Table 4 to guide our 
predictions: we expect gender and our measures of religiosity to have no effect. Though race is 
commonly and reasonably included as a control variable, our sample is predominantly white and 
therefore does not have enough variation to detect any racial effects. Including race in the analysis 
did not meaningfully change our results in any way. 
The results for specifications (1) – (4) are displayed in Table 5. The state-level charity is 
omitted for comparison. Consistent with the identifiable victim literature and Hypothesis 1, the 
coefficient on the person in town is significant and large in all specifications: subjects give 
considerably more to the person than to other levels (e.g., subjects give on average $11.50 more 
than to the state organization). We conclude from this that when an individual is included in the 
consideration set the relative impact of a donation becomes more salient than its geographic reach, 
in comparison to giving to other (organization) recipients. 
Hypothesis 2 posits that the organizations will be considered differently than the individual 
recipient and, following Li et al. (2011), we will observe donation magnitude to correlate with 
organizations’ reach. We do not find consistent support for this hypothesis in Table 5. Subjects 
tend to give more to the national ($1.58) and local ($3.34) charities than to the state charity. 
Importantly, our full model (4) shows subjects giving a statistically significant amount more to 





Table 5: Tobit Results for Comparative Dictator Game 
Dependent Variable: Amount Sent (1) (2) (3) (4) 
National charity 1.371 † 1.566 * 1.389 † 1.581 * 
(0.807) (0.770) (0.811) (0.777) 
Local charity 3.104 ** 3.317 ** 3.124 ** 3.340 ** 
(0.925) (0.883) (0.934) (0.893) 
Person in town 11.53 ** 11.66 ** 11.57 ** 11.71 ** 
(1.224) (1.230) (1.228) (1.235) 
Age (in years)  0.252 **  0.240 ** 
 (0.0737)  (0.0728) 
Male  −1.046  −0.858 
 (2.253)  (2.205) 
High church attendance  4.011 †  2.990 
 (2.339)  (2.271) 
College  −4.192 †  −4.165 † 
 (2.225)  (2.242) 
Low income  −2.866  −1.564 
 (2.385)  (2.356) 
Trust in institutions   1.722 2.579 † 
  (1.512) (1.547) 
Trust in people   6.959 ** 5.203 ** 
  (1.823) (1.725) 
Constant 19.97 ** 11.37 * −6.198 −11.19 
(1.165) (4.638) (6.251) (7.762) 
σ 22.01 ** 21.18 ** 21.54 ** 20.87 ** 
(1.053) (1.011) (0.999) (0.990) 
     
Observations 1,240 1,200 1,236 1,196 
Number of subjects 310 300 309 299 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1.  
 
 
This causes a U-shaped giving curve across geographic level of operation. The relationship 
between ‘National’ and ‘State’ is consistent with Li et al. (2011) but the relationship between 
‘State’ and ‘Local’ is exactly the opposite. There are two potential explanations for this difference: 
sample composition and consideration set. Our sample consists of adults aged 18–86 (mean of 45) 
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instead of students, which (under Hypothesis 3b) we believe affects beliefs about the effectiveness 
of organizations operating at each level that informs charitable behavior. We test this more 
formally below. Another potential explanation is that we have added an individual to the subjects’ 
consideration set. Though each decision was made independently, simply adding the individual 
could affect how subjects consider giving to the other charities, possibly by shifting some internal 
reference point. We do not claim this as fact but offer it as conjecture, as our experiment is not 
designed to test how an additional recipient in the consideration set affects reference points. 
There is markedly little evidence of significant demographic effects on giving across these 
specifications. Consistent with the literature and Hypothesis 3b, age is consistently positive and 
significant (p < 0.01) and economically meaningful: 10 additional years of age corresponds to a 
$2.40–$2.50 increase in giving. Considering our sample spans ages 18–84 there is room for 
considerable differences in giving behavior. 62  Men give slightly less than women, but the 
difference is insignificant. Church attendance (religiosity) has a weak positive relationship to 
giving behavior here, which is possibly driven by giving to the Salvation Army (a religiously-
affiliated charity). People earning less than $30,000 a year give less than those earning more but 
not in a statistically meaningful way. Having at least some college education is negatively 
correlated with the amount given. Though this relationship is not statistically significant (p < 0.1), 
the sign is counterintuitive: education is typically positively correlated with giving. 
Columns 3 and 4 include the trust survey measures, which are a preliminary test of 
Hypothesis 3a. Trust in institutions does not have a significant effect on giving. Trust in people, 
however, has an economically and statistically significant relationship with giving across both 
 
62 Results for second and third degree polynomials for age were insignificant. We concluded that a linear 
specification was most appropriate. 
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specifications: when accounting for other factors, an additional point increase in trusting people 
corresponds to approximately a $5 increase in sending (p < 0.01). We do not draw any definitive 
conclusions on Hypothesis 3a from these results, because we suspect that these indices will have 
a clearer relationship with giving when analysis is disaggregated. Still, it is surprising that “Trust 
in People” has an effect on the pooled data because it is likely to be isolated to lower levels (local 
and person). This suggests that people who score high on this index either always give large 
amounts (to all levels) or the effect is so strong in the lower levels that it is not washed out by 
pooling the data. Results below suggest that the former explanation is correct. 
As discussed above, subjects gave approximately $10 more to the individual than any other 
level. This supports the importance of impact over reach when giving to an identifiable victim. 
Beyond this, however, rejecting Hypothesis 2 means impact and reach are related to each other. 
Subjects likely respond to some mixture of these two factors heterogeneously at each level, so we 
now turn to the disaggregated analysis. 
4.2.  Comparative Dictator Game: Disaggregated Analysis 
We retain similar Tobit models as in 4.1, but restrict each specification by level (j) which 
necessarily means we no longer include level controls: 
𝐺𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝑫𝑗𝜷𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 (5) 
𝐺𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝑰𝑗𝜹𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗  (6) 
𝐺𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝑫𝑗𝜷𝑗 + 𝑰𝑗𝜹𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 (7) 
where 𝑫𝑗 and 𝑰𝑗 are the demographics and trust indices vectors defined as above for each level j 
and 𝜀𝑖𝑗 is the subject-level specific error term. The results for equation (7) are displayed in Table 
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6. Results for specifications (5) and (6) are not meaningfully different from (7) and are available 
in Table B-1. 
 
Table 6: Tobit Results for Comparative Dictator Game, by Charity Level 
Amount sent to: National State Local Person 
Age (in years) 0.263 ** 0.202* 0.306** 0.182 † 
(0.0870) (0.0792) (0.0802) (0.100) 
Male −3.350 -2.874 1.719 1.345 
(2.471) (2.246) (2.440) (3.066) 
High church attendance 1.349 0.339 3.177 7.558 * 
(2.608) (2.366) (2.565) (3.141) 
College −5.082 * -4.707* -3.286 −3.616 
(2.533) (2.299) (2.439) (3.019) 
Low income 0.474 -0.0584 -0.803 −6.375 * 
(2.629) (2.370) (2.575) (3.144) 
Trust in institutions 5.265 ** 3.500* 1.409 −0.06 
(1.843) (1.614) (1.753) (2.082) 
Trust in people 2.306 5.383** 6.697** 6.432 * 
(2.109) (1.773) (1.949) (2.547) 
Constant −6.895 -10.85 -14.80+ 5.719 
(8.718) (7.866) (8.659) (10.65) 
σ 20.19 ** 18.59** 19.73** 24.29 ** 
(1.190) (1.092) (1.142) (1.410) 
     
Number of subjects 299 299 299 299 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1. 
 
 
As with the aggregate analysis, age has a persistent, significant, positive relationship with 
giving, further confirming Hypothesis 3b. Across all levels, an additional 10 years corresponds to 
sending between $2.02–$3.06 more. When controlling for all factors this age effect is strongest 
with the local-level charity.  
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There is also level-specific heterogeneity in other demographic characteristics. Consistent 
with the findings from Section 4.1, the coefficients on gender, church attendance, and income are 
not statistically distinguishable from zero at the national, state, or local level. This changes when 
people make allocation decisions with a person. Subjects with high church attendance give $7.56 
more (p < 0.05), on average, to a person than subjects with low church attendance, when including 
all relevant covariates. This further supports our conclusion that measuring organization-level 
preferences are not confused with organization preferences in our experiment (i.e. religious 
subjects do not display a preference for the Salvation Army because it is a religious organization). 
Subjects who make less than $30,000 a year give $6.38 less (p < 0.05), on average, than 
subjects with a higher income. This implies that the identifiable victim effect is stronger for people 
with higher church attendance and higher incomes. Likewise, this implies that, if reach is a 
dimension on which subjects make charitable decisions, it is uncorrelated with most demographics 
or, at least, they do not systematically move together (e.g. men do not systematically value the 
reach of national over state charities more than women). The coefficient on college education is 
negative and significant (p < 0.05) at the national and state level, meaning that subjects with more 
education gave approximately $5 ($4.70) less to the national (state) level charity. This implies 
there is some relationship between education and beliefs about the efficacy of higher-level 
charities. Since education is almost always an endogenous choice, we don’t make a causal claim.  
The trust indices offer additional insights. We observe that an additional point on the 
institutional trust index corresponds to sending approximately $5 more to the national charity (p < 
0.01). This means that an increased trust in institutions is meaningfully expressed in giving 
behavior, supporting Hypothesis 3a that subjects hold underlying beliefs about the efficiency of 
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different charity-levels. Further supporting Hypothesis 3a, institutional trust carries over to affect 
giving to the state charity ($3.50, p <0.05). Consistent with intuition, the magnitude of the 
institutional trust effect monotonically diminishes as the recipient becomes ‘closer’ to the subject 
where ‘trust in people’ instead takes over as the operating behavioral mechanism. The institutional 
trust index is uncorrelated with political party affiliation (covariance = 0.0687) or political 
ideology (covariance = 0.0533), and the effect documented in Table 5 is unchanged by the 
inclusion of party and ideology controls. 
The coefficient on the index for trusting in people is similarly consistent with intuition and 
Hypothesis 3a. An increased trust in people (by one point on our index) corresponds to a $5.38, 
$6.70, and $6.43 increase in giving to the state charity (p < 0.01), local charity (p < 0.01), and 
person (p < 0.05), respectively, when controlling for other demographic characteristics. As noted 
in Section 4.1, subjects who score higher on the ‘people trust’ measurement likely give more in 
general, though it is apparently limited to ‘lower level’ recipients. We would expect a trust in 
people to most strongly affect giving to a person, but interestingly it does not. This is likely because 
other factors take over at the person level (religiosity or income). Overall, we find strong support 
for Hypothesis 3a between our two trust indices with a slight modification—beliefs about the 
trustworthiness of institutions and people map into donative behavior in a meaningful way. 
4.3.  Consistent Givers 
One challenge to interpreting our results from the CDG above and the SDG below are 
subjects whose revealed preferences exhibit indifference between recipient levels. The allocation 
decision at each level was made independently, but this does not preclude subjects from giving the 
same amount to each recipient. Ninety-six subjects (30.97% of the sample) were consistent givers: 
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they allocated the same amount to each recipient. Table 7 shows a summary of the consistent givers 
by demographics. 
 
Table 7: Summary of Varying and Consistent Givers’ Characteristics 
 Frequency (%) Age (average) Male High Church College Low Income 
Varying 214 (69.03%) 46.05 0.43 0.39 0.57 0.52 




Table 7 shows that restricting our results to only varying givers (subjects who did not send 
the same amount to all recipients) would make our sample slightly older, more male, more 
religious, and lower income. There is no statistically significant relationship between demographic 
characteristics and the likelihood of being a consistent giver, with the exception of religiosity: 
frequent church attendees are less likely to give the same amount to each recipient (Table B-3). 
Consistent people most frequently chose to evenly divide the $60 endowment (30.21%) 
and ended up at the extremes of $0 (keep everything) and $60 (send everything) approximately 
15.63% and 14.58% of the time, respectively. A detailed description of the consistent givers’ 
donation distribution is in Table B-2. Basically, we see no reason to believe that including 
consistent givers biases our results; omitting them leaves us with less statistical power. 
4.4.  Selected Dictator Game 
We now turn to the selected dictator game (SDG), the second task, where subjects chose 
one recipient out of the four levels from the CDG. If the SDG was selected for payment, subjects 
received the allocation for their chosen level from the CDG, with the remainder going to the 
selected organization. Subjects were unaware of the SDG when making allocation decisions in the 
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CDG. The SDG is a form of revealed preference. However, it has three implications. First, it can 
indicate which charity the subject most prefers, independent of their allocation choice. Second, it 
could reveal an income-enhancing preference in which subjects chose the charity to which they 
gave the least (thereby maximizing what they earned if the task were selected for payment). 
Finally, it could reveal the subject’s desire to maximize their contribution to a charity in which the 
subject chose the charity to which they gave the most. Disentangling this from the first implication 
is difficult except for those subjects who always gave the same amount to each charity. As stated 
in Hypothesis 4 and consistent with Candelo et al. (2019), we expect subjects to be income-
enhancing and choose the charity to which they gave the least in the CDG. 
Figure 4 shows what proportion of subjects chose each level, as well as the distributions 
for consistent and varying givers. Consistent with giving patterns observed in Section 4.1, the 
majority of subjects prefer the individual person to be the recipient followed by local, national, 
and then state charities. Revealed preference theory tells us that consistent givers are indifferent 
between each of the levels. If that were true, we should see uniformity in the first distribution. Not 
only is the consistent givers’ distribution not uniform, but it is remarkably similar to the varying 
givers’ and total distributions. This implies that consistent givers are not truly indifferent between 
levels and are not so different from varying givers but have a similar behavioral response 










Figure 4: Consistent and Varying Givers in the Selected Dictator Game 
 
Results presented for level – National (N), State (S), Local (L), and individual person (P) – over consistent and varying 
givers and the full sample. Consistent givers sent the same amount to all four levels in the Comparative Dictator Game. 




Following the results from Section 4.2, there are plausibly heterogeneous preferences for 
SDG choice by demographic characteristics. For example, if people who attend church more give 
more to a person recipient, we can hypothesize that they will also be more likely to choose that 
level in the SDG. We test these choice and demographic relationships using an ordered logit model. 
We are interested in estimating the probability of choosing each level given some control variables, 
or 𝑃(𝐶 = 𝑘 | 𝑫, 𝑨, 𝑰), ∀𝑘 = 1, 2, 3, 4, where 𝑫 and 𝑰 are defined as above, 𝑨 is a vector containing 
the amount each subject sent to each level, and 𝐶 is defined as 
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𝐶 = {
1         𝑖𝑓 𝐶∗ ≤ 𝜇1            
2         𝑖𝑓 𝜇1 < 𝐶
∗ ≤ 𝜇2 
3         𝑖𝑓 𝜇2 < 𝐶
∗ ≤ 𝜇3 
4         𝑖𝑓 𝐶∗ > 𝜇3           
 (8) 
We calculate this using the latent variable models 
𝐶∗ =  𝑫𝜷 + 𝑨 + 𝜉 (9) 
 𝐶∗ = 𝑫𝜷 + 𝑨 + 𝑰𝜹 + 𝜉 (10) 
An ordered logit model is particularly well-suited for this estimation because our charities’ 
levels retain a natural ordering (where 1 = national, 2 = state, 3 = local, and 4 = individual). 
Estimating this model gives us the predicted probability that subject i selects charity j from their 
decisions in the CDG, conditional on their characteristics (i.e., age, gender, church attendance, 
income, education), their trust indices, and the amounts they sent to each level. The results are 
displayed in Table 8. 
We find little evidence of demographics influencing charity choice in the SDG. The only 
variable that is significant at conventional levels is age: There is a negative relationship between 
age and the level chosen (p < 0.05), meaning that older persons are less likely to select local 
organizations. 
We now turn to the analysis testing Hypothesis 4. In their CDG study, Candelo et al. (2019) 
observed this purely selfish behavior. They argue that subjects must compete internally between 
financial self-interest and the desire to feel charitable by giving some amount away, and show that 
in their case, financial self-interest ultimately overpowered subjects’ altruism. We do not observe 
this: the coefficients on the donations to each recipient are small and statistically insignificant, and 
uncorrelated with their choice in the SDG. 
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Table 8: Ordered Logit Results for Selected Dictator Game 
Dependent Variable: Charity Level Chosen (9) (10) 
Age −0.0143 † (0.0076) −0.0157 * (0.0077) 
Male 0.295 (0.234) 0.265 (0.235) 
High church attendance 0.247 (0.254) 0.256 (0.257) 
College −0.360 (0.257) −0.388 (0.261) 
Low income −0.334 (0.273) −0.321 (0.276) 
Amount sent to national −0.0180 † (0.0103) −0.0172 † (0.0103) 
Amount sent to state −0.00979 (0.0133) −0.00959 (0.0135) 
Amount sent to local 0.0133 (0.0126) 0.0133 (0.0129) 
Amount sent to person 0.0159 † (0.0087) 0.0156 † (0.0088) 
Trust in institutions   −0.135 (0.191) 
Trust in people   0.0394 (0.223) 
     
Cutoff 1 −2.338 ** (0.522) −2.603 ** (0.836) 
Cutoff 2 −1.781 ** (0.507) −2.045 * (0.823) 
Cutoff 3 −0.715 (0.490) −0.974 (0.809) 
     
Observations 300  299  




We examine this more closely in Tables 9 and Figure 5. We restrict our analysis here to 
varying givers only, since the minimum and maximum charities are equivalent for consistent 
givers. Table 9 is a tabulation of how many subjects chose each level in the SDG and breaks this 
down by those who chose the charity where they sent the least (min charity) and the most (max 
charity). We define a subject’s min (max) charity as the recipient to which they gave less (greater) 
than or equal to the next lowest (highest) amount sent to all other recipients by that subject. Figure 
5 shows this information as a percentage of the total within each panel. For example, 23.73% 
(69.05%) of the subjects who chose their min (max) charity in the SDG selected the ‘person’ level. 
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Table B-4 shows probit results for the probability of choosing the min (columns 1–2) and max 




Figure 5: Choosing the Maximum and Minimum in the Selected Dictator Game 
 
Results presented for level – National (N), State (S), Local (L), and individual person (P) – over subjects that chose 
their max or min charity and the full sample. Chose Max (Min) denotes that a subject chose the level in the Selected 
Dictator Game to which they sent the most (least) in the Comparative Dictator Game. 
 
 
Table 9: Summary of Selected Dictator Game Choices 
 Total National State Local Person 
Full sample 310 52 26 72 160 
Varying givers 214 39 18 50 107 
     Chose min 59 12 11 22 14 
     Chose max 126 17 5 17 87 
     Chose other 29 10 2 11 6 
Consistent givers are omitted from lines 2-5 because their minimum and maximum are equivalent. 
 151 
Table 9 shows that substantially more people chose their max charity (126) in the SDG 
than their min charity (59). This further supports the rejection of our Hypothesis 4. 
Additional analysis (see columns 1 and 2 of Table B-4) show that no socio-demographic 
variables are correlated with the probability of choosing one’s min charity in the SDG. The 
coefficient on the people trust index is negative and statistically significant (p < 0.05): An 
additional point of trust on the index corresponds to a 36.2% decrease in the probability of 
choosing the min charity. This is unsurprising given the strong, positive relationship between this 
index and the amount sent (as described in Table 6). Those with higher trust in people are likely 
much more generous donors. They are not so altruistic, however, as to choose the max charity as 
shown in column 4. The coefficient on the people trust index is positive but is not significant at 
conventional levels (p < 0.1). Interestingly, men are much more likely than women (54%, p < 0.01) 
to choose their max charity in the SDG. This is surprising considering there were no gender 
differences in the amounts given across levels. Furthermore, the literature typically posits women 
as behaving more altruistically than men while we find the opposite here. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
We use a comparative dictator game and selected dictator game to explore how subjects 
differentiate between charities at different levels (national, state, local, individual) that have similar 
missions. Our study is conducted using a sample of adults, and our experiments are coupled with 
a survey collecting rich set of demographic and attitudinal information, which allows us to test for 
demographic and attitudinal correlates of charitable giving. To our knowledge, we are the first to 
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use this experimental design with adults and the first to include an anonymous individual in the 
consideration set alongside different charity-levels with a similar mission. 
We anticipated that donors might consider the breadth of the reach of the charitable 
organization, as well as the impact of their own donation in making their allocations. We 
hypothesized that impact would be most salient when considering an identifiable person, so giving 
would be highest at that level. We find support for this hypothesis, with subjects giving roughly 
$6.50–$9.50 more to the individual than any other level. We then propose that subjects consider 
organizations differently than an individual because the impact of their donation is less clear. We 
find only some support for our hypothesis that giving monotonically increases with the level, 
finding instead a U-shaped giving curve: giving to national and local charities was higher than 
state charities. We also find heterogeneous effects on giving by age and indices that measure trust 
in institutions and people. This confirms that giving behavior is at least partially determined by 
beliefs about the relative effectiveness of aid at each level, which varies across subjects. In 
addition, we find that college educated donors are more likely to give to a national charity, while 
church goers are more likely to provide charity at a local or individual level. 
Finally, when given the opportunity to select which of their dictator decisions to be 
implemented, we are able to see whether people pursue a strategy of maximizing their own 
earnings by choosing their smallest donation, or whether they select the target to which they 
donated the most, reflecting their preferences for the altruistic action. Importantly, donors are not 
indifferent across charities, choosing the local victim more than half the time. This is true even for 
those who donate the same amount to all four charitable recipients. While these people should be 
indifferent between the four recipients, as revealed by their donation amounts, they are not, as 
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revealed in their greater likelihood of selecting the anonymous individual recipient. Drawing from 
a similar, previous study, we hypothesized that donors would ultimately act in their own financial 
self-interest, choosing the charity to which they gave the least in the CDG. We reject this 
hypothesis, finding that subjects primarily select the organization to which they gave the most, 
revealing a stronger preference for altruism than selfishness in this environment.  
For fundraisers, our research has three implications. First, we further confirm the 
importance of highlighting individual recipients whenever possible. Donors value the relative 
impact of their donation and this impact is clearest when the recipient is an identified individual 
(even if the person is anonymous). While this is not a novel idea to current philanthropic 
fundraising practices, we believe there is a second important takeaway for organizations operating 
at several levels. If soliciting donations for a menu of operating levels within an organization, 
including an individual recipient on the list may change behavior. Lastly, if the organization 
operates at many geographic levels (local, state, national), we recommend including all of them 
on the menu – separate from an identifiable individual – for potential donors to consider so that 
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 Charitable giving is a fundamental household financial decision – even when giving isn’t 
planned, nearly everyone will be solicited for donations at some point in their life either by a friend, 
family member, neighbor, or stranger volunteering for a nonprofit. Moreover, charitable giving is 
a significant part of the economy – both as a percent of GDP and as an employer – that affects the 
lives of all Americans. Being such a fundamental decision, it is crucial that we understand how 
households think about donations to better inform philanthropists and policy makers. 
 We discussed here four different behavioral facets of charitable giving: responses to 
changes in resources (income and wealth), responses to changes in real tax policy, responses to 
changes in hypothetical policy, and how beliefs about people and institutions mediate donative 
behavior in disaster relief. Each chapter expands the wealth of knowledge that exists in the field 
of economics and altruistic behavior and opens many additional research questions to further 





Figure A-1: OLS, Unconditional Winsorized Percent of Giving, by Income 
 
Notes: This figure displays the coefficients for each income bin from OLS regressions for three levels of winsorizing: 
10%, 20%, 30%. Estimates combine the extensive and intensive margins. Winsorizing caps the maximum possible 
percent of income given for a household at 10%, 20%, or 30%. Households giving a larger proportion of their income 
are assigned a value equal to the maximum. All specifications include income bin and year indicators; the lowest 
income bin is omitted for comparison. Household characteristics described in Section 3.2 are included. Error bars 
represent the 95% confidence interval. Robust standard errors are clustered at the household level. 
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Figure A-2: OLS, Unconditional Winsorized Percent of Giving, by Wealth 
 
Notes: This figure displays the coefficients for each wealth bin from OLS regressions for three levels of winsorizing: 
10%, 20%, 30%. Estimates combine the extensive and intensive margins. Winsorizing caps the maximum possible 
percent of income given for a household at 10%, 20%, or 30%. Households giving a larger proportion of their income 
are assigned a value equal to the maximum. All specifications include wealth bin and year indicators; the lowest wealth 
bin (negative wealth) is omitted for comparison. Household characteristics described in Section 3.2 are included. Error 
bars represent the 95% confidence interval. Robust standard errors are clustered at the household level. 
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Figure A-3: Fixed Effects, Unconditional Winsorized Percent of Giving, by Income 
 
Notes: This figure displays the coefficients for each income bin from fixed effects regressions for three levels of 
winsorizing: 10%, 20%, 30%. Estimates combine the extensive and intensive margins. Winsorizing caps the maximum 
possible percent of income given for a household at either 10%, 20%, or 30%. Households giving a larger proportion 
of their income are assigned a value equal to the maximum. All specifications include income bin and year indicators; 
the lowest income bin is omitted for comparison. Time-varying household characteristics described in Section 3.2 are 
included. Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval. Robust standard errors are clustered at the household level. 
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Figure A-4: Fixed Effects, Unconditional Winsorized Percent of Giving, by Wealth 
 
Notes: This figure displays the coefficients for each wealth bin from fixed effects regressions for three levels of 
winsorizing: 10%, 20%, 30%. Estimates combine the extensive and intensive margins. Winsorizing caps the maximum 
possible percent of income given for a household at either 10%, 20%, or 30%. Households giving a larger proportion 
of their income are assigned a value equal to the maximum. All specifications include wealth bin and year indicators; 
the lowest wealth bin (negative wealth) is omitted for comparison. Time-varying household characteristics described 
in Section 3.2 are included. Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval. Robust standard errors are clustered at 






Table B-1: Additional Tobit Results for Comparative Dictator Game, by Level 
Amount 
Sent to: 
National State Local Person 
Age  
(in years) 
0.242**  0.211**  0.332**  0.214*  
(0.086)  (0.079)  (0.083)  (0.099)  
Male 
−3.802  −3.036  1.63  1.296  
(2.508)  (2.323)  (2.478)  (3.083)  
High church 
attendance 
2.49  1.579  4.17  8.22*  
(2.683)  (2.422)  (2.63)  (3.181)  
College 
−5.665*  −4.865*  −3.028  −3.214  
(2.52)  (2.285)  (2.395)  (3.043)  
Low income 
−0.157  −1.44  −2.437  −7.941*  
(2.646)  (2.407)  (2.601)  (3.106)  
Government 
 4.739**  3.228*  0.548  −1.951 
 (1.721)  (1.577)  (1.78)  (2.071) 
People 
 2.959  6.181**  8.601**  10.26* 
 (2.044)  (1.847)  (2.151)  (2.636) 
Constant 
14.45** 0.544 14.65** −7.250 8.977† −5.392 24.81** 4.2 
(5.069) (6.88) (4.721) (6.404) (5.066) (7.282) (5.993) (8.68) 
σ 
20.53** 20.71** 19.06** 19.2** 20.11** 20.76** 24.57** 25.3** 
(1.205) (1.191) (1.122) (1.094) (1.177) (1.163) (1.408) (1.448) 
         
Number of 
subjects 
300 309 300 309 300 309 300 309 




Table B-2: Distribution of Amounts Sent by Consistent Givers 











$0 15 15.63 37.50 37.50 39.47 60.00 
$1 1 1.04 16.67 16.67 25.00 100.00 
$5 3 3.13 17.65 23.08 37.50 42.86 
$6 2 2.08 40.00 33.33 28.57 66.67 
$10 16 16.67 31.37 27.59 34.78 43.24 
$20 11 11.46 21.57 23.40 20.75 26.19 
$30 29 30.21 40.85 42.03 38.16 39.19 
$35 1 1.04 33.33 20.00 33.33 100.00 
$40 3 3.13 13.04 18.75 13.04 13.64 
$50 1 1.04 14.29 11.11 12.50 7.69 
$60 14 14.58 58.33 73.68 50.00 22.58 
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Table B-3: Demographic Differences between Consistent and Varying Givers 
Dependent Variable:  
Probability of Being A Consistent Giver 
OLS Probit 
Age −0.000578 −0.00144 
 (0.000863) (0.00252) 
Male −0.0387 −0.112 
 (0.0274) (0.0782) 
High church attendance −0.109 ** −0.318 ** 
 (0.0284) (0.0850) 
College 0.0129 0.0383 
 (0.0286) (0.0807) 
Low income 0.0289 0.0865 
 (0.0287) (0.0820) 
Constant 0.375 ** −0.328 * 
 (0.0533) (0.151) 
   
Observations 1200 1200 
R2 0.018  
Robust standard errors in parentheses: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1. 
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Table B-4: Probit Results for Choosing Min and Max in Selected Dictator Game 
Subject Chose Their Personal: Min Max 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age 
−0.0103 † −0.00794 0.00345 0.00126 
(0.00616) (0.00647) (0.00583) (0.00615) 
Male 
−0.311 −0.323 0.540 ** 0.542 ** 
(0.198) (0.204) (0.187) (0.192) 
High church attendance 
−0.195 −0.164 0.250 0.233 
(0.206) (0.208) (0.195) (0.199) 
College 
−0.133 −0.0636 0.186 0.133 
(0.202) (0.210) (0.195) (0.202) 
Low income 
0.388 † 0.303 −0.249 −0.180 
(0.209) (0.215) (0.195) (0.199) 
Government 
 0.0623  −0.0973 
 (0.147)  (0.137) 
People 
 −0.362 *  0.277 † 
 (0.155)  (0.151) 
Constant 
−0.106 0.752 −0.194 −0.723 
(0.379) (0.645) (0.359) (0.609) 
     
Observations 205 205 205 205 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.1. Analysis restricted to varying givers 






C-1: Excerpt from Instructions at the Beginning of the Experiment 
We are going to ask you to make some decisions and answer some questions. In the first part 
of this you will make some decisions to determine how much additional money you will receive. 
After all the decisions, you will answer some survey questions on natural disasters and other things 
about you and your community. Keep in mind that there are no right-or-wrong answers. We are 
interested in YOUR opinions and the way YOU make decisions. Are there any questions so far? 
 
C-2: Excerpt from Instructions at the Beginning of Task 5 (Comparative Dictator Game) 
Example 1—Look at the first decision. In this decision you have $60 which you must allocate 
between yourself and the recipient. Here the recipient is the American Red Cross Disaster Relief 
fund. 
Now I am going to give you some information about the American Red Cross Disaster Relief 
Fund:  
The American Red Cross Disaster Relief fund is a nonprofit charity that focuses on providing 
aid to disaster victims nationwide. It meets people’s immediate emergency disaster caused needs 
for shelter, food and health services. In this box, you will write how much of the $60 you would 
like to allocate to the American Red Cross Disaster Relief Fund. Suppose you want to allocate 
$42. This means you will keep $18, the rest of the $60 you were given initially, for yourself. Notice, 
these amounts must add up to $60. 
Example 2—Look at the second decision. In this decision you have $60 which you must 
allocate between yourself and the recipient. Here the recipient is the United Way of Texas.  
Now I am going to give you some information about the United Way of Texas: 
The United Way of Texas is a nonprofit charity dedicated to meeting the needs of people across 
the state. It enables health and human services to get back in operation after a disaster. In this 
box, you will write how much of the $60 you would like to allocate to the United Way of Texas. 
Suppose you want to allocate $6. This means you will keep $54, the rest of the $60 you were given 
initially, for yourself. Notice, these amounts must add up to $60.  
Example 3—Look at the Third decision. In this decision you have $60 which you must allocate 
between yourself and the recipient. Here the recipient is the local Salvation Army. Now I am going 
to give you some information about the local Salvation Army. The local Salvation Army is a 
nonprofit charity which focuses on providing clothing and food to disaster victims locally. In this 
box, you will write how much of the $60 you would like to allocate to the local Salvation Army. 
Suppose you want to allocate $0. This means you will keep all $60 for yourself. Notice, these 
amounts must add up to $60. 
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C-3: Excerpt from Instructions Describing the Payment Selection Process 
To decide which task is going to be paid, we will pick an envelope out of this box. The 
envelopes look just like this example (grab example envelope). Inside the envelopes are cards with 
numbers on them. On this example card you can see a number sign (open example envelope to 
show card with number sign). The card that’s drawn will be numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. The 
number that is selected is the number of the task you will be paid for. 
 
C-4: Questions Used to Calculate Demographic Variables 
Church Attendance 
“How often do you attend church services or church related meetings?” 
 
1=More than once a week 
2=Once a week 
3=A couple of times a month 




High church attendance is a binary variable set to unity if a subject reported attending church at 
least once a week. 
Education 
“Please indicate your highest level of education:” 
 
1= Less than 9th grade 
2= Between 9th grade and 12th grade (no diploma) 
3= High school graduate or GED 
4= Some college (no diploma) 
5= Graduated from college (Associate’s degree, Bachelor’s degree or above) 
6= Advanced degree 
 
College is a binary variable set to unity if a subject reported having any college education. 
Household Income 
“What was your household income, before taxes and other deductions, from all sources (for 
example, wages, child support, alimony, investments, government or social assistance, grants) 
for the last 12 months? Please give us your best guess if the exact figure is not known.” 
 
1=Less than $10,000 
2=$10,000 to less than $20,000 
3=$20,000 to less than $30,000 
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4=$30,000 to less than $40,000 
5=$40,000 to less than $50,000 
6=$50,000 to less than $60,000 
7=$60,000 to less than $75,000 
8=$75,000 to less than $100,000 
9=$100,000 to less than $125,000 
10=Greater than $125,000 
 
Low income is a binary variable set to unity if subjects report a yearly household income of less 
than $30,000. 
 
C-5: Questions Used to Calculate Attitudinal Indices 
Subjects responded to the below questions with the following scale.  
1=Trust completely 
2=Trust somewhat 
3=Do not trust very much 
4=Do not trust at all 
Institutions: 
How much do you trust the following: City government 
How much do you trust the following: State (Texas) government 
How much do you trust the following: The Governor 
How much do you trust the following: Federal government 
How much do you trust the following: FEMA 
People 
How much do you trust the following: Your neighbors 
How much do you trust the following: Your coworkers 
How much do you trust the following: Fire department 
Indices were rotated to be increasing in trust and scaled to be between 1 and 4. 
 
